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The Challenges and Risks of
Creating Independent Regulatory
Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from
Brazil
MarianaMota Prado*

ABSTRACT

Between 1996 and 2002, the Brazilian government
established independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) for
electricity,
telecommunications, oil,
gas,
and
other
infrastructuresectors as part of a very ambitious privatization
program. Following the formulas advocated internationally,
Brazilian IRAs have institutional guarantees of independence,
such as fixed and staggered terms of office for commissioners,
congressional approval of presidential nominations, and
alternative sources of funds to ensure their financial autonomy.
This Article analyzes the design of IRAs in Brazil and asks
whether their institutional guarantees of independence were
effective in insulating them from the political sphere. The
Author's general conclusion is that these guarantees-typicalof
developed countries, especially the United States-failed to
insulate Brazilian agencies. The Article indicates a number of
episodes of political influence over agencies, and it applies
detailed institutionalanalysis to explain what went wrong. The
Brazilian experience illuminates the difficulties that many
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developing countries face in trying to realize the ideal of
regulatory independence and the benefits that would supposedly
flow from this. Thus, it might serve as a cautionary tale for
policymakers and for developing countries contemplating
similar reforms.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Intuitively, it always seems better to have more options than
There are many circumstances, however, in which this
fewer.
intuition is wrong. In Homer's Odyssey, for instance, Ulysses chose
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to tie himself to the mast of his boat, and to seal his seamen's ears
with wax, so as not to succumb to the temptation of luring his boat to
destruction by hearing the Sirens sing. Without tying himself,
Ulysses would have had two options: succumb to the song of the
Sirens and destroy his boat, or resist the temptation and sail safely to
his destination. Ulysses knew that sailors on previous trips had not
been able to resist the temptation and was afraid that he would meet
the same fate. So, he chose to tie himself. For Ulysses, eliminating
one of his options was the best strategy to reach his destination
safely.1
During the privatization process, Latin American countries have
encountered a situation very similar to the one faced by Ulysses.
After a decade of negligible levels of economic growth and enormous
fiscal deficits, Latin American countries were advised to sell their
2
state-owned companies, especially those in infrastructure sectors.
Selling these companies would reduce spending of fiscal resources,
increase efficiency in the delivery of infrastructure services, and
attract much-needed private investments to these sectors and to the
country as a whole. 3 Privatization of key infrastructure sectors would
be an easy way out of the trap that Latin American countries found
themselves in at the end of the 1980s, except for one important detail:
private investors were not willing to sink large investments in fixed,
unmovable infrastructure assets without having some guarantees
4
that they would not be expropriated by opportunistic governments.

1.

For the use of this metaphorin the context of pre-commitment or self-

binding, see JOHN ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND

IRATIONALITY (1979). Since then, Elster has revised his original analysis twice in
Ulysses and the Sirens (1984) and more recently in Ulysses Unbound (2000). JOHN
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRATIONALITY (2d ed.
1984); JOHN ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITI'MENT,
AND CONSTRAINTS (2000).
2.
See generally LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED?

(John Williamson ed., 1990) (examining the major policy instruments that should be
used to urge Latin American debtor nations to make fundamental changes in their
economic policies).
3.
The most influential development doctrine in Latin American in the 1990s,
which became known as the Washington Consensus, advocated for an economic policy
based on fiscal austerity, free trade, and privatization. The expression "Washington
Consensus" was coined by John Williamson. John Williamson, What Washington
Means by

Policy Reform,

in

LATIN

AMERICAN

ADJUSTMENT:

How

MUCH

HAS

HAPPENED? 7, 7-20 (John Williamson ed., 1990). For a discussion of its current
meaning, see John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think About the
Washington Consensus, 15 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 251(2000).

4.
In Eastern Europe and Russia, privatization was often accomplished
through "shock therapy" that divested state assets with little concern for the creation of
strong legal and regulatory structures. As a result of the weaknesses of these efforts,
the specialized literature has converged on the claim that the sale of state-owned
companies should be preceded by an institutional and regulatory framework to
guarantee competition and protect investors from state opportunism. For a brief
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Thus, a successful privatization would be more likely to attract
private investment to infrastructure sectors if governments were
willing to tie themselves to the mast of their boats. The most
important self-binding strategy for Latin American countries was to
delegate their regulatory powers to independent regulatory agencies
(IRAs). 5 The assumption was that IRAs 6 enjoy "autonomy" from
elected politicians, thereby reducing the risks of expropriation,
political manipulation, or short-term considerations related to the
electoral cycle that could adversely affect private investment
incentives in relevant sectors. 7 As a result, the creation of IRAs
became one of the central institutional issues in the context of
8
privatization reforms.
This Article argues that this self-binding strategy has not
worked. The Brazilian experience with IRAs shows that despite
delegating regulatory powers to independent agencies, the
9
government was still able to influence agency decisions.
Institutional guarantees that characterize IRAs in developed
countries, especially the United States, were not enough to insulate
Brazilian IRAs from the political sphere. 10 Based on a detailed
institutional analysis, the Article explains why this happened and
discusses the lessons that can be learned from the Brazilian
experience.

review of this debate, see Scott Wallsten, Does Sequencing Matter?: Regulation and
Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms 2-7 (World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 2817, 2002).
5.
The analogy between delegation of power to independent entities and
Ulysses' strategy was originally made by Jon Elster. Jon Elster, ConstitutionalCourts
and Central Banks: Suicide Prevention or Suicide Pact?, E. EUROPEAN CONST. REV.,
Summer 1994, at 66, 67. Brazilian scholars have used the analogy to refer to IRAs.
See, e.g., Marcus Andr6 Melo, A Politica da A~do Regulat6ria: Responsabilizagdo,
Credibilidade e Delega~do [The Politics of Regulation: Responsibility, Credibility and
Delegation], 16 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIENCIAS SOCLAIS 55, 55-68 (2001); Regina
Pacheco, El Control de las Agencias Reguladoras en Brasil: Ulises y las Sirenas o
Narciso? [The Control of Regulatory Agencies in Brazil: Ulysses or Narcisus?], in LA
RESPONSABILIZACION EN EL ESTADO: ASPECTOS TEORICOS Y EPISTEMOLOGICOS 215
(2005).
6.
The terms IRAs, agencies, and regulatory agencies will be used
interchangeably in this Article.
7.
Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes
and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 J. PUB. POLY 139, 152-55
(1997).
See generally Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, The Diffusion of
8.
Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the
Making of a New Order, 598 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 102 (2005) (analyzing
the "restructuring of the state in Latin America and the consequent institutionalization
of a new regulatory order")
9.
See infra Parts III-V (discussing presidential influence on regulatory
agencies and the institutional design of independent agencies).
10.
Id.
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These lessons are relevant because Brazil was not alone in
believing that IRAs were the solution." The World Bank and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
recommended that countries promoting regulatory reforms and
privatizations should create IRAs. 12 Advocates of these reforms
3
believed that IRAs would create credible regulatory commitments,'
thereby increasing the value of the state-owned companies to
investors and attracting more private investment. 14 During the
1990s, U.S.-style IRAs were adopted in many European and Latin
American countries, 15 becoming one of the primary means of
regulatory governance worldwide. 16 In sum, despite this Article's

11.
See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD], THE OECD
REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: SYNTHESIS (1997) (recommending regulatory reform
and setting forth the reasons for this solution).
12.
OECD, THE OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: VOLUME II: THEMATIC
STUDIES (1997); OECD, REGULATORY POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES: FROM
INTERVENTIONISM TO REGULATORY GOVERNANCE (2002); WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK
TECHNICAL PAPERS NO. 399, CONCESSION FOR INFRASTRUCTURE: A GUIDE TO THEIR
DESIGN AND AWARD (1998), available at http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Toolkits/
concessionsfulltoolkit.pdf; WORLD BANK, THE WORLD'S BANK ROLE IN THE ELECTRIC
POWER SECTOR: WORLD BANK POLICY PAPER (1993), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/defaultfWDSContentServerWDSP/IB/1999/09/1710001788
30_98101911183588/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf; OECD, Independent Regulators in
South East European Countries (2003), availableat http://www.investmentcompact.org/
pdf/9thPTMtglndependentRegulators.pdf; World Bank, How to Strengthen Regulatory
Framework/Agencies, Document presented at the Water Forum (2002), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWSS/Resources/337301-1147283821774/0508
framework.pdf; World Bank, Regulatory Governance Background Note presented at
the African Forum for Utility Regulation (2002). At quite an early stage in the debate,
the idea was also supported by WTO. World Trade Organization [WTO], Negotiating
Group on Basic Telecommunications: Reference Paper (Apr. 1996), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serve/telecome/tel23_e.htm.
13.
For an exploration of the idea of regulatory commitment, see DAVID
NEWBERY, PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, AND REGULATION OF NETWORK UTILITIES
62 (2001); REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller eds., 1998); Pablo T. Spiller,
Institutions and Regulatory Commitment in Utilities' Privatization, 2 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 317 (1993); Pablo T. Spiller, A Positive Political Theory of Regulatory
Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law or Regulatory Specificity?, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 477 (1996).
14.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Promoting Competition in Telecommunications (Centro
de Estudios Economicos de la Regulacion, Working Paper Series: Buenos Aires, 1999);
see also Newbery, supra note 13, at 73 (noting that the "costs [of private ownership]
may take the form of a high rate of return required to reward investors for the high
perceived regulatory risk.").
15.
JACINT JORDANA & DAVID LEVI-FAUR, HACIA UN EsTADo REGULADOR
LATINOAMERICANO? LA DIFUSI6N DE AGENciAS REGULADORAS AUT6NOMAS POR PAISES
Y SECTORES [Towards a Latin American Regulatory State? The Diffusion of
Independent Agencies in Countries and Sectors] (2005); Giandomenico Majone, The
Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. EUR. POL. 77 (1994).
16.
See OECD, REGULATORY POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES: FROM
INTERVENTIONISM TO REGULATORY GOVERNANCE, supra note 12 ("One of the most
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focus on Brazil, the conclusions presented here should be relevant to
policymakers and reforming countries around the globe.
Between 1996 and 2002, the Brazilian government established
IRAs for electricity, telecommunications, oil, gas, transportation, and
other infrastructure sectors. 17 These agencies were implemented as
part of a very ambitious privatization program, in which the
government was not only able to attract private investment, but was
also able to sell state-owned companies for relatively high prices.' 8
One could ascribe this successful outcome to the Brazilian
government's credible commitment not to act opportunistically once
investments had been made. In fact, many have claimed that the
independence of Brazilian agencies has boosted investors'
confidence. 19
Against this claim, the Author argues that the
Brazilian IRAs are not as insulated from electoral cycles and the
political sphere as they are perceived or expected to be.
Following the formulas advocated internationally, Brazilian
IRAs were designed to have fixed terms of office for commissioners,
Congressional approval of presidential nominations, and alternative
sources of funds to ensure their financial autonomy.20 These and

widespread institutions of modern regulatory governance is the so-called independent
regulator ....
").
17.
In this period, nine regulatory agencies were implemented in Brazil:
Ag6ncia Nacional de Energia EI6trica-ANEEL (Electricity); Ag6ncia Nacional do
Petr6leo-ANP (Oil and Gas); Ag6ncia Nacional de Telecomunica 6es-ANATEL
(Telecomunications); Ag6ncia Nacional de Vigil~ncia Sanitdria-ANVISA (Sanitary
Vigilance/ Health Inspectors); Ag6ncia Nacional de Safide Suplementar ANS (Private
Health Care Services); Ag6ncia Nacional de Aguas-ANA (Water); Ag6ncia Nacional de
Transportes Aquavidrios-ANTAQ (Water Transportation); Ag6ncia Nacional de
Transportes Terrestres-ANTT (Ground Transportation); Ag6ncia Nacional do
Cinema-ANCINE (Cinema).
18.
Francisco Anuatti-Neto et al., Costs and Benefits of Privatization:Evidence
from Brazil 3 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank Research Network Working Paper No. R-455,
2003); see also Armando Castelar Pinheiro, Privatiza~dono Brasil:Por Qua? At6 Onde?
Atj Quando? [Privatization in Brazil: Why? How Far? Until When?], in, A ECONOMIA
BRASILEIRA NOS ANos 90, 178 (Fabio Giambiagi & Mauricio Moreira eds., 1999).
19.
See, e.g., Lee J. Alston et al., Political Institutions,Policymaking Processes
and Policy Outcomes in Brazil 38 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank Working Paper No. R-509,
2004) ("[T]he most important means by which the government signaled a credible
commitment to not act opportunistically was by designing the agencies so as to give
them a high degree of independence."); Luiz Carlos Mendonga de Barros, As Agincias
Reguladoras e a Terceiriza~do do Governo [Regulatory Agencies and Contracting Out
Governmental Functions], FOLHA DE SkO PAULO, Mar. 7, 14, & 21, 2003 (series of three
articles).
In addition, an inter-ministerial group published a report in favor of
independence as guaranteed by the current institutional design of the agencies.
RELAT6RIO DO GRUPO DE TRABALHO INTERMINISTERIAL, CASA CIVIL (C.MARA DE INFRA
ESTRUTURA-C.MARA DE POLiTICA ECONoMIcA), ANAIiSE E AvALiA AO DO PAPEL DAS
AGtNCIAS REGULADORAS NO ATUAL ARRANJo INSTITUCIONAL BRASILEIRO [Analysis and
Assessment of the Role of Regulatory Agencies in the Brazilian Institutional Scenario]
(Sept. 2003).
20.
See Warrick Smith, Utility Regulators-The Independence Debate, PUB.
POL'Y FOR PRIVATE SECTOR, at 3 (World Bank Group, Note No. 127, Oct. 1, 1997),
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other institutional features were implemented to guarantee that
these agencies were not subordinated to the President's directive
authority or to any other branch of government. 21 These features
22
aimed to provide a high level of independence to Brazilian agencies.
This Article demonstrates that the aim went unfulfilled.
Because the Brazilian IRAs' design was inspired by the
American experience, this Article will compare the effectiveness of
23
IRA guarantees of independence in Brazil and in the United States.
In particular, the Article suggests that IRAs are not very independent
in Brazil for three reasons. First, some institutional features of U.S.
24
agencies were not implemented or fully transplanted to Brazil.
Second, some successful institutional features of the U.S. political
and legal system were unsuccessful in Brazil. 25 Finally, some
problematic features of the U.S. system were transplanted to Brazil,
replicating many of the problems that have long existed in the United
26
States.
The Brazilian experience illuminates the difficulties that many
developing countries face in trying to realize the ideal of regulatory
independence and the benefits that would supposedly flow from this.
Also, it replicates many of the challenges and obstacles in
implementing development reforms around the world. First, the
Brazilian case shows that political economy is often an impediment to
institutional reforms in developing countries. Second, it illustrates

available at
http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournall127smith.pdf
(providing a summary of the "strong consensus on the formal safeguards required [by
independent agencies]").
21.
This was the first time that bodies of the Brazilian public administration
were not subject to the direct authority of the President. Although some bodies
(autarquias)were supposed to have a higher degree of autonomy even before the
reform, they are not equivalent to the IRAs and will not be included in the analysis
developed here.
22.
See GESNER OLIVEIRA, DESENHO REGULAT6RIO E COMPETITIVIDADE:
EFEITOS SOBRE OS SETORES DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA [Regulatory Design and Competition:
Impact on Infrastructural Sectors] (2005), available at http://www.eaesp.fgvsp.br/
AppDataIGVPesquisa/PO0338_l.pdf (desigining an index to measure the independence
of agencies, and indicating that Brazil has one of the highest levels of independence in
the world).
23.
This is not to say that Brazil modeled its IRAs after the American
regulatory agencies. The process of diffusion of these agencies is looser and highly
influenced by other countries in the region and in Europe that were conducting similar
reforms.
In fact, the design of regulatory agencies in Brazil, both for the
telecommunications and electricity sectors, resemble the ones adopted in other
countries, such as the United Kingdom, Argentina, and Chile. See JORDANA & LEVIFAUR, supra note 15. When the reforms started, however, the American agencies were
the models available and their pioneerism and long existence guaranteed their status
as a model throughout the whole process.
24.
See infra Part V.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
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the need to adapt legal transplants to the local conditions and
particularities of the reforming country. Finally, it highlights the
dangers of adopting an overly idealized view of the way the
transplanted legal system operates in the country of origin.
The Article concludes that before starting the quest for an
institutional design suited to the Brazilian context, the Brazilian
government should ask if these agencies should, in fact, have high
levels of independence. Brazil, and many other reforming countries,
have yet to engage in a meaningful discussion about bureaucratic
independence, its goals, and its limits. 27 Some of the cases discussed
in this Article suggest that bureaucratic independence might increase
investors'
protection against opportunism, but that such
independence might also impair the government's ability to control
inflation or to protect legitimate consumer interests. Advocates of
agency independence emphasize one single goal-investors'
protection-and ignore the fact that some types of political
interference with regulation might be guided by legitimate and
justifiable goals. The assumption that all political interference with
the regulation of infrastructure sectors will be opportunistic is the
basic assumption behind all these reforms. This simplistic view of
institutional reforms needs to be replaced with a more comprehensive
analysis of the full-scale consequences of the institutional options
third world countries can pursue.
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part II shows that regulatory
commitment was the main rationale behind the creation of IRAs in
Brazil, and that insulation from Presidential influence was the main
concern in providing such commitment to investors. Part III presents
examples of Presidential influence over agencies. This evidence
indicates that regulatory agencies in Brazil may not be as
independent as their structure might suggest. Within this context,
Parts IV and V investigate how this could have happened by
analyzing the institutional design of regulatory agencies in Brazil.
Part IV develops a historical analysis and shows that despite having
a common rationale (investors' protection), circumstantial factors led
to different institutional
designs for the IRAs
in the
telecommunications and electricity sectors. The different designs of
these agencies will be explored in detail in Part V, which develops an

27.
See Jordana & Levi-Faur, supra note 8, at 119 (concluding that the rise of a
new regulatory capitalism in Latin America is clearly occurring and that while it can
be explained by a process of "social learning," the authors "could not confidently cite
evidence of 'learning' in the sense that followers' observations took into account the
effects of change in the structure of the state on growth and foreign and private
investment").
For a brief discussion of the tension between investment and
development goals, see Anton Eberhard, Regulation of Electricity Services in Africa: An
Assessment of Current Challenges and an Exploration of New Regulatory Models 1422 (paper prepared for World Bank Conference, June 2005), available at
http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/gsbwebb/mir/documents/InfrastructureRegulationinAfrica.pdf.
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analysis of the agencies' institutional guarantees of independence and
shows that IRAs in Brazil are not as independent as generally
perceived or expected. Specifically, the Author argues that the
electricity agency has fewer guarantees of independence than the
telecommunications agency. Part VI draws some policy lessons from
the Brazilian experience. The general conclusion is that IRAs are not
a strong mechanism to secure regulatory commitment in Brazil,
especially in the electricity sector, but it is not clear whether reforms
to make these agencies more independent would be advisable given
the range of policy goals pursued by the government.

II.

THE CREATION OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES IN BRAZIL

In Brazil, the creation of regulatory agencies for the
telecommunications and electricity sectors was largely informed by
an interest in signaling the government's commitment to a stable,
existing regulatory framework (also known as "regulatory
commitment"). 28 The assumption was that political opportunism and
concerns associated with electoral cycles may affect the application of
the regulatory framework and the interpretation of statutes and
contracts, thus undermining investors' confidence. 29 The agencies'

28.
For a list of sources helpful in exploring further the idea of regulatory
commitment, see supra note 8.
29.
Interview with Carlos Ari Sundfeld, Former Legal Advisor to the Cardoso
Administration on the Privatization of Telecommunication Companies, and Member of
the Commission that Designed the Regulatory Agency (Jan. 2006) (on file with author);
Interview with Renato Guerreiro, Former Secretary of Telecommunications, Former
President of ANATEL, and Mentor of the Privatization Reforms in the
Telecommunications Sector (Feb. 2006) (on file with author). Representatives in
Congress shared the idea. For instance, representative Jos6 Carlos Aleluia stated the
following during a speech made at the House of Representatives to justify increasing
the level of independence of the electricity sector agency: "We are establishing an
agency (ANEEL) which represents the modernity of the Brazilian state and creates
conditions for investors-who will see a country with stable rules and clear
interpretations of these rules-to come and invest in the expansion of the electricity
sector." Jos6 Carlos Aleluia, Braz. Cong. Representative, Speech before the House of
Representatives (July 9, 1996), in DIARIO DA CAkARA DOS DEPUTADOS, Oct. 17, 1996, at
19649, available at http://www2.camara.gov.br/publicacoes (Follow "Publicaq6es
Oficiais de C~mara dos Deputados"; fill in "17/10/1996" in Data field and "19649" in
Pdgina Inicial field). The same idea was expressed in the Senate for both the
electricity and the telecommunications agencies. Jos6 Fogaqa, Braz. Senator, Speech
before the Senate (Oct. 17, 1996), in DIARIO DO SENADO FEDERAL, Oct. 18, 1996, at
17196, available at http://www.senado.gov.br/sf/atividadelPronunciamento/Detalhes.
asp?d= 197830; Jos6 Fogaqa, Braz. Senator, Speech before the Senate (Nov. 27, 1996),
in DIARIO DO SENADO FEDERAL, Nov. 28, 1996, at 19140, available at
http://www.senado.gov.br/sf/atividade/Pronunciamento/Detalhes.asp?d=195867.
It is
important to note, however, that in the case of the electricity sector in Brazil, where
the privatization was not completed, the remaining state-owned companies also
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independence would reduce this risk by insulating the regulatory
30
framework from the political sphere.
The Executive branch was the main proponent of IRAs in Brazil.
It is not completely clear where the proposal to implement IRAs in
Brazil actually came from, or even whether the proposal came from
31
one single source or from different sources in the executive branch.
Despite its unclear origin, many people involved in the process of
creating IRAs in Brazil frequently point to international influences. 32
Following the international discourse, the proponents of IRAs in
Brazil believed that a decision by the Executive branch to create selfimposed limits on its regulatory powers by delegating them to IRAs
would be interpreted as a signal of commitment and would attract
investors. 33 Following this discourse, the executive branch sent bills
34
to Congress proposing the creation of IRAs.
There are at least three possible reasons why the Brazilian
government decided to follow the international discourse and why
governments around the world are increasingly relying on IRAs. 35
First, politicians are willing to improve the credibility of their policies

became a powerful interest group. In this case, their interests could also affect the
regulatory framework, although they would not do so because their political interests
are connected with electoral cycles
30.
See supra note 29.
31.
One of the first documents that refers to regulatory agencies in Brazil was
a memo prepared by Renato Navarro Guerreiro in 1994. The memo set up an agenda
of reforms for the telecommunications sector, including the creation of an independent
regulatory agency, in which regulators appointed by the President and approved by
Senate would take collegiate decisions. The memo was later published by ANATEL,
entitled
Comunica(Ses: Infraestrutura para a Revoluvdo da Informado
[Communications: Infrastructure for an Information Revolution]. For an historical
overview of the process in the telecommunications sector, including the reference to
Guerreiro's memo, see Jos6 Prata et al., S9RGIO MOTTA: 0 TRATOR EM AQAO [S6rgio
Motta: A Strong Person in Action] 70-71 (1999).
32.
Luiz Moreira, Braz. Cong. Representative, Speech at the House of
Representatives (Nov. 6, 1996), in DiARIO DA CAMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, Nov. 7, 1997, at
35763; see also Jos6 Carlos Aleluia, Braz. Cong. Representative, Speech at the House of
Representatives (July 9, 1996), in DIARIO DA CkMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, July 10, 1996,
at 19648; Telephone Interview with Renato Navarro Guerreiro, Former Secretary of
Telecommunications, Former President of ANATEL, and Mentor of the Privatization
Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector (Feb. 2006); Interview with Luiz Ant6nio
Ramos Veras, Member of the Permanent Staff of ANEEL (July 2003) (on file with
author).
33.
Melo, supra note 5, at 63-64; see also Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira,
Credibility and the Design of Regulatory Agencies in Brazil, BRAZ. J. POL. ECON., JulySept. 2003, at 65, 66-69.
34.
See infra Part IV for a discussion of the details of this process.
35.
See Fabrizio Gilardi, Spurious Change in Regulatory Policies: Regulation
through Independent Agencies and the Three New Institutionalisms, in THE POLITICS
OF REGULATION: EXAMINING REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS IN THE AGE

OF GOVERNANCE 67, 67-69 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004) (calling these
three reasons rational choice, sociological reasons, and historic institutionalism,
respectively).
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and solve the problem of political uncertainty in order to guarantee
the success of privatization reforms. 36 Second, regulatory agencies
have now been taken for granted as the appropriate form for
regulation, and politicians are just following the trend without asking
whether there are any concrete benefits in doing so. 37 Third, there
are network effects of implementing such institutions once a number
of countries have implemented them. 38 That is, the shift to IRAs can
be seen as an attempt to capture the gains of "positive feedback" or
"increasing returns" created by the presence of IRAs in other
countries. 39 It is not clear which of these three motivations, if any,
prevailed in Brazil, but there is no reason to rule any of them out as
plausible explanations of the creation of IRAs by the Cardoso
administration.
The fact that the executive branch was the main proponent of
IRAs in Brazil and was the entity conducting the reforms, shifts the
focus of our attention to the President. 40 In the United States, the
prevalent theoretical approach to regulatory agencies is to model a
principal-agent relationship between the regulatory agency (agent)
and the entity that delegates its power (principal). 41 In the American
scenario, the principal is Congress, but in the case of Brazil it is the
42
President.
One could argue that this Presidential-dominance model does not
necessarily rule out some sort of influence by Congress on IRA
decisions; however, this is not the case in Brazil. In the United
States, Congress can influence IRAs by changing (or threatening to
change) the enabling act or statute, by limiting the agency's
discretion through legislation, by monitoring agencies through
oversight committees, and by imposing controls on the agency's

36.
Id.; see also Giandomenico Majone, Temporal Consistency and Policy
Credibility: Why Democracies Need Non-Majoritarian Institutions (European Univ.
Inst., Working Paper No. 96/57, 1996).
37.

Gilardi, supra note 35; see also JORDANA & LEVI-FAUR, supra note 15.

38.
Gilardi, supra note 35.
39.
Id.
40.
The word President is used here to refer to the executive branch in general;
it thus includes the President himself and any of the political appointees who can be
dismissed at will, such as Ministers.
41.
For a discussion of the principal-agent relationship between regulatory
agencies and the entity that delegates its power, see Mariana Mota Prado, Towards a
Theory of PresidentialDominance: An Analysis of the Relationship between Government
and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil, REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO

RICO (forthcoming).
42.
For an exploration of this idea in greater detail, see id. For an earlier
version of this article, see Mariana Mota Prado, Institutional Reforms, Legal
Transplants, and Political Systems (unpublished paper presented at the SELA
Conference, Yale Law School, June 12-15, 2007), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/sela[MarianaMotaPradoEnglish_.pdf.
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budget.4 3 The Congress, however, is not as strong in Brazil, where
the Brazilian President has more control over the legislative process,
thus reducing the Congressional power to change the enabling statute
of agencies or to limit Presidential discretion through statutes. 44 In
addition, the Brazilian Congress has no oversight power over the
heads of independent agencies and has very few controls on IRA
45
budgets.
In sum, the Brazilian Congress has very little power to exert
influence over independent agencies, whereas the President has
significant powers to do so. Thus, in contrast with the United States,
once agencies have been established, the biggest threat to their
independence comes from the President, who can influence IRAs in
4
many ways, including the imposition of controls on IRA budgets. "
The President not only has power to influence regulatory
agencies, but may also have incentives to do so. If the President will
be held electorally responsible for what the agencies are doing, for
instance, the President has strong incentives to try to influence them
to implement popular policies. For example, the President could try
to make the agencies reduce the electricity rates for residential
consumers, given that electricity rates have been historically
determined by the executive branch and are likely to be perceived as
47
the President's responsibility even after privatization.
Also, the President might feel the need to avoid conflicts between
regulatory policies implemented by sectoral regulators and other
policies that are being implemented by the Executive branch. Thus,
even if the President is not acting opportunistically, he may have
strong motivation to interfere in some regulatory decisions in order to
ensure that they will not conflict with the Executive branch's social or
macroeconomic policies. For instance, the President might find a
need to reduce telecommunications and electricity rates to control

43.
See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to
Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1456-59 (2003) (discussing the ways in
which Congress controls delegations to agencies).
44.
See, e.g., Rett R. Ludwikowski, Latin American Hybrid Constitutionalism:
The United States Presidentialismin the Civil Law Melting Pot, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 29,
41-42 (2003) (noting that Brazil has historically adopted constitutions "reserving the
president extensive legislative prerogatives").
45.
See infra Part V.F. for a detailed discussion of this lack of oversight power
and controls on IRA budgets.
46.
See discussion infra Part V.
47.
Lula might have tried to claim responsibility for popular policies
implemented by independent agencies and to avoid responsibility for unpopular
policies.
This hypothesis seems to explain the controversial and somewhat
contradictory position of the Lula Administration regarding independent agencies. For
an exploration this idea in greater length, see Mariana Mota Prado, Accountability
Mismatch: As Ag~ncias Reguladoras Independentes e o Governo Lula. [Independent
Regulatory Agencies and the Lula Administration], in AGNcIAS REGULADORAS E
DEMOCRACIA (Gustavo Binenbojm ed., 2005).
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inflation. Because there are many different situations where the
regulation of the infrastructure sector can affect or overlap with other
governmental policies, it seems reasonable to assume that the
President will often have incentives to try to influence the agencies.
Finally, the Brazilian bureaucracy may facilitate Presidential
influence over agencies. Before privatization, the regulations for
telecom and electricity were under the Executive branch's jurisdiction
(through Ministries). 48 After privatization, people inside the Ministry
who previously worked under the former regulatory framework could
continue to operate under the assumption that the new regulatory
agencies are subordinated to the Executive branch. Institutional
memory will not disappear overnight, and this may distort the way
bureaucrats interact with the new agency. This phenomenon may be
aggravated if the agency's staff is composed of people who used to
work for the Ministry or for the former regulator before the
49
privatization, as was the case in the electricity sector.
In sum, the Executive branch's institutional powers, the
Brazilian bureaucracy's traditions and habits, and the incentives that
may affect presidential behavior, combine to make the President the
most significant threat to the independence of agencies and the
stability of the regulatory framework. Hence, an analysis of the
actual level of independence of the Brazilian regulatory agencies
should focus on the relation between these agencies and the
President.

III.

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES

To set the stage for the analysis in the rest of the Article, Part III
presents several concrete situations in which there are signs of
varying degrees of presidential influence over regulatory outcomes. 50

48.
This is not to say that the functions of both regulators were exactly the
same. Before the privatization process, the regulator of the electricity sector was a
body within the Ministry of Mines and Energy called National Bureau of Waters and
Electricity (DepartamentoNacional de Aguas e Energia Eldtrica-DNAEE). The new
regulatory agency for the electricity sector (ANEEL) was actually implemented as a
replacement of DNAEE, but according to the letter of the statutes, ANEEL has much
broader powers than DNAEE ever had. The same applies to the telecommunications
sector.
49.
In fact, three of the directors of the former regulatory body, DNAEE,
eventually became directors of ANEEL. See infra note 161. The lower staff of DNAEE
also became staff of ANEEL. Interview with Luiz Antdnio Ramos Veras, supra note 32.
50.
More conclusive evidence could be gathered through a quantitative analysis
assessing over a certain period of time whether changes in presidential administration
are associated with changes in regulatory outcomes. At this point, however, the
Brazilian experience with regulatory agencies is too short to indicate major trends.
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Only cases in which presidential preferences (or Executive-branch
preferences) were publicly known are discussed. 51 By contrasting the
final regulatory outcome with publicly announced Presidential
preferences, Part III will identify when these preferences were
implemented by the relevant agency. An interesting aspect of the
cases is that often the agency initially manifested a preference
contrary to the Presidential preferences, but that the final outcome
was closer to the Presidential preferences than to the agencies'
52
preferences.
Part III makes two points. First, concrete cases demonstrate
that there is presidential influence on regulatory outcomes in Brazil.
Second, these cases suggest that the telecommunications agency
Ag~ncia Nacional de Telecomunica 6es (ANATEL) is more
independent than the electricity agency Agincia Nacional de Energia
Eldtrica (ANEEL). However, these interagency differences may be
declining over time.
The cases illustrate the most important efforts by President Luis
In~cio Lula da Silva's first administration (2003-2006) to influence
the behavior of the electricity and telecommunications agencies. The
Article will discuss two cases related to increases in the
telecommunications and electricity rates and two cases regarding
regulation in general. With one exception, 53 the publicly announced
presidential preferences were implemented by the agencies.
A. Increases in ElectricityRates
At the time of President Lula's inauguration in January 2003,
representatives of the new administration publicly stated their
intention to halt electricity rate increases. 54 However, to avoid a
decrease in investors' confidence in the sector, the newly elected

Agencies have been operating in Brazil for only ten years. During this period, there
was only one major shift in presidential administration (the election of Lula), and some
might argue that Lula's administration, which started in 2003, was not very different
from the previous one. See Larry Rohter, DepartingPresident Leaves a Stable Brazil,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002 (reporting that President Cardoso remained in office for
eight years, stepping down in 2003, and that President Lula took office in 2003 after
winning the presidential election). Although the Author does not fully agree with this
assumption (in many instances, Cardoso and Lula's administrations had opposite
views, especially with respect to the importance of agencies and the necessities of
regulated markets), one might not be able to identify major shifts in regulatory
outcomes from one administration to the next in the same way as one can do in the
United States.
51.
This selection avoids the complexities of assessing the presidential
preferences.
See infra Part III.B.
52.
53.
See infra Part III.B (showing the rate increase for the telecommunications
sector, when ANATEL decided to implement a regulation different from the one
"suggested" by the Ministry of Telecommunications). *
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government sought to halt increases without changing legislation or
contracts. 55 In this context, the strategy chosen by the government
was to influence the electricity sector agency (ANEEL), which was in
charge of interpreting and applying the statutory and contractual
56
provisions related to electricity rate increases.
Following the government's announcements, ANEEL's first
decision regarding electricity rates was to limit the level of the
increases to which utility companies were entitled in that particular
year. 57 To comprehend ANEEL's action, one must first understand
the difference between electricity rate adjustments and rate
increases. Distribution companies are entitled to annual rate
increases
composed
of
inflationary
and
non-inflationary
adjustments.5" These annual increases are called rate adjustment
(reajuste tarifdrio).59
Every four years, electricity distribution
companies are entitled to a re-evaluation of the rate structure; during
the re-evaluation, ANEEL considers the factors that comprise the

54.
In her inauguration speech, Dilma Rousseff, the Minister of Mines and
Energy, said that one of the challenges of the Ministry was to "halt the ever rising
increases of electricity rates and fuel prices." Mesmo Independente, Agincia Leva em
conta Posigdes de Lula na Revisdo [Despite Being Independent, Agency Takes
Presidential Preferences into Acccount], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Feb. 18, 2003, at B1.
Also, in the very first week of Lula's government, the executive secretary of the
Ministry declared in an interview that "the role of the agencies is to oversee and
execute the government's directives . . . the electricity rates adjustment will be made by
ANEEL according the orientation provided by the Ministry." Ag~ncias Devem Perder
seu Poder [Agencies Are Likely To Lose Their Power], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Jan. 7,
2003, at B5.
55.
Ronaldo D'Ercole, Dirceu Quer Rever Modelo de Reajuste das Tarifas de
Energia e Telefone [President's Chief of Staff Wants To Revise Electricity and
Telecommunications Tariffs], 0 GLOBO (Sdo Paulo), Mar. 8, 2003, available at
http:/infoener.iee.usp.br/infoener/hemeroteca/imagens/70618.htm.
56.
Actually, the Ministry of Mines and Energy developed three different
proposals to halt rate increases. Humberto Medina, Governo que Reajustes Menores
para Conter Inflacdo [Government Wants To Halt Increases to Avoid Inflationary
Pressures], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Mar. 9, 2003. Two of them were implemented
unilaterally by executive decree and therefore are not relevant to our analysis here. Id.
One was related to subsidies and the other was related to compensations for currency
devaluation. Id.
57.
Humberto Medina, Aneel Limita Aumento das Contas de Luz [Agency
Limits Tariff Increases], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Feb. 18, 2003, at B1.
58.
Brazil has adopted a price-cap regulation for the electricity sector.
According to this system, the regulatory agency defines the maximum rate that utility
companies can charge (price-cap) and grants an annual increase to adjust for inflation
in manageable costs (X) and to transfer non-manageable costs (Y) to consumers. The
electricity rate increase equals X times (price index minus productivity factor) plus Y,
divided by the total annual revenue of the previous year. Lei no 8.987, de 13 de
fevereiro de 1995 (Brazil).
59.
For more details, see AGENCIA NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ELECTRICA [ANEEL],
CADERNOS TEMATICOS ANEEL, N. 4 TARIFAS DE FORNECIMENTO DE ENERGIA EL9TRICA
[Tariffs
for
Electricity
Distribution
Services]
(2005),
available
at
http://www.aneel.gov.br/arquivos/pdf/caderno4capa.pdf.
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rate and determine the inflationary and non-inflationary
adjustments.6 0 This special increase is called rate review (revisdo
tarifdria).61 The system of rate increases was supposed to work as
follows: after the rate review, distribution companies would continue
62
to have yearly rate adjustments for four years until the next review.
Since the processes used to determine rate increases in adjustments
and in reviews are different, normally the levels of increases also
differ. 63 For some companies, the rate review would imply much
higher increases than those that would occur if the government were
64
merely making an adjustment.
ANEEL decided to limit the rate increases by adopting whatever
procedure (adjustment or review) that would bring the lowest
increase. 65 More specifically, ANEEL limited reviews to a -level of
increase equivalent to a rate adjustment if the former was higher
than the latter. 66 Whenever the rate reviews would yield increases
greater than adjustments, ANEEL would grant an adjustment, not a
review. 67 In contrast, in the case of utilities that would have a higher
increase with the adjustment, ANEEL would only grant them the
68
review.
ANEEL normally submits the proposed methodology for rate
review to the public for notice and comment (audi~ncia publica)
before implementing it. 69 In the case of this particular decision to
limit increases, however, ANEEL did not submit the methodology to
the public. 70 Instead, the decision was first announced in February

60.
Id.at 21-22.
61.
Id. at 23.
62.
ANEEL, PERGUNTAS E REPOSTAS SOBRE TARIFAS DE ENERGIA ELITRICA
[Q&A on Electricity Distribution Rates] 6 (2007) available at http://www.aneel.gov.br/
biblioteca/Perguntas-e_Repostas.pdf.
63.
Id.
64.
Medina, supra note 57 (citing the example of Enersul, in the state of Mato
Gross do sul. In 2003, Enersul's review would grant a 42.64% increase in the rates
whereas in an adjustment the increase would be reduced to 28.55%).
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
The process of public notice and comment works as follows: the proposal of
the agency is publicized, and anyone (consumers, companies, or non-profit
organizations) can submit written comments to the proposal. Lei no. 9.427 de 26 de
Dezembro de 1995, art. 4, § 3, Decreto no. 2.335 de 06 de outubro de 1997, art. 21, and
Resoluqdo ANEEL no. 233 de 14 de Julho de 1998, Norma de Organizagdo ANEEL001, art. 13. See also Agencia Nacional de Energia Electrica [ANEEL], Considera 6es
Gerais, http://www.aneel.gov.br/area.cfm?idArea=401 (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
Then, ANEEL holds an open meeting for public discussion of the proposal and the
comments. Id. After the meeting, ANEEL enacts its final decision. Id. ANEEL
follows the same process before taking a final decision on the rate review of each
individual company. Id.
70.
See Medina, supra note 57 (reporting ANEEL's decision to limit rate
increases and announcing the methodology that would be used in the rate review).
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2003, when ANEEL submitted to public notice and comment the
proposed rate increase of four out of seventeen electricity distribution
companies (most of them privatized companies) scheduled for a rate
review in 2003.71 Despite the companies' complaints, ANEEL used
the same criteria to propose four other companies' increases in
March. 72 At least two companies had their increases actually limited
73
by the agency.
ANEEL stated that it was not refusing to grant the full increase
as determined by the rate review process; instead, it was
implementing a rollover.7 4 The company would be entitled to recover
the lost revenue (calculated as the revenue that would be obtained
with the difference between the percentage of the increase in the rate
adjustment and in the review adjusted to inflation) in the next three
increases. 75 Enersul, for instance, was entitled to increase its
electricity rates by 42.64% in 2003, but instead received an increase
of 32.59%.76
From 2004 to 2007, Enersul would have a rate
adjustment plus an additional increase each year, which would grant
a rate of return equivalent to the one the company should have had in
77
2003.

71.
ANEEL's proposed increase for each one of the other four companies was:
28.55% for Enersul, a distribution company (disco) in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul;
18.77% for CPFL, a disco in the state of Sdo Paulo; 27.49% for Cemig, a disco in the
state of Minas Gerais; and 24.99% for Cemat, a disco in the state of Mato Grosso.
ANEEL, BOLETIM ENERGIA, No. 65 (Feb. 19-26, 2003), http://www.aneel.gov.br
arquivos/PDF/BOLETIMENERGIA_065 3.htm
(last visited
Feb.
16, 2008)
[hereinafter ANEEL Boletim 65]. CPFL complained that ANEEL was defining the rate
reviews according to criteria that did not go through the notice-and-comment process
and had never been used before. Id.; see also Medina, supra note 57 (reporting the
methodology established for the rate reviews).
72.
See ANEEL, BOLETIM ENERGIA, No. 67 (Mar. 12-18, 2003),
http://www.aneel.gov.br/arquivos/PDF/BOLETIMENERGIA_067.htm
(last visited
Feb. 16, 2008) (stating that ANEEL submitted to notice and comment the rate
increases for four companies in the Northeast region - Coelce (27.65%), Cosern
(12.06%), Energipe (28.4%) and Coelba (27.19%)); see also Luz Vai Subir at6 28,4% no
Nordeste [Electricity Will Increase in 28.4% in the Northeast], FOLHA DE SAo PAULO,
Mar. 12, 2003, at B4.
73.
See Conta de Luz Sobe at6 31,29% para 8,261 Milh6es de Consumidores
[Electricity Prices Increase up to 31.29% for 8.261 Million Consumers], FOLHA DE SAO
PAULO, Apr. 18, 2003, at B3 (stating that Energipe and Coelba had their increases
limited. Energipe was entitled to a 35.47% increase, but was granted only 29.71%;
Coelba was entitled to a 31.49% increase, but was granted 28.61% instead).
74.
ANEEL, Res. 167/03 (April 7, 2003), available at http://www.aneel.gov.br/
cedoc/res2003167.pdf [hereinafter ANEEL Res. 167/03].
75.
Id.
76.
Id.; see also Humberto Medina, Governo Quer Reajustes Menores para
Conter Infla!do [Government Wants To Halt Increases To Contain Inflation], FOLHA DE
SAO PAULO, Apr. 9, 2003, at B3.
77.
ANEEL Res. 167/03, supra note 77, art. 3.
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The central question here is whether or not the Lula
administration influenced ANEEL's decision to limit the electricity
rate increases. Aside from never holding a notice-and-comment
process to discuss its decision, ANEEL did very little to justify the
limitation, stating only that the limits on the increases were imposed
to reduce the impact of the increases on consumers.7 8 This argument,
however, was challenged by one of the most active consumer
protection entities in Brazil, IDEC, which claimed that the additional
increases to compensate companies for loss of revenue would hurt
79
consumers in the long term.
Another potential reason for the decision is related to inflation.
As mentioned earlier, the Lula administration was planning to halt
rate increases, and this decision has often been reported in the
newspapers as an attempt to control inflation.80 It is debatable,
however, whether levels of inflation are within the scope of the
regulatory agency's mission. ANEEL's self-declared mission is to
promote favorable conditions for the development of the electricity
market while balancing the interests of companies and society.8 1 In
addition, statutory provisions define the tasks under the agency's
jurisdiction.8 2 These statutory provisions do not mention inflation or
any macroeconomic issues. 83 In fact, the Brazilian Central Bank and
the Ministry of Finance are the entities in charge of this and other
macroeconomic issues.8 4 Thus, ANEEL was not justified in limiting
the increases on these grounds.8 5 In contrast, Lula's administration

78.
ANEEL Boletim 65, supra note 71.
See, e.g., Letter from Marilena Lazzarini, Coordenadora Executiva,
79.
Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor, to Jos6 M~rio Miranda Abdo, Diretor
Geral da Ag~ncia Nacional de Energia El6trica (Mar. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.idec.org.br/files/carta-enersul.doc (asking ANEEL to limit the increase for
Enersul).
See, e.g., Luz Vai Subir atj 28,4% no Nordeste [Electricity Prices Will
80.
Increase up to 28.4% in the Northeast], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Mar. 12, 2003, at B4;
Humberto Medina, Conta de Luz Vai Subir Mais que a Inflacao [Electricity Increases
More Than Inflation], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Apr. 7, 2004.
81.
ANEEL, Missiio da ANEEL, http://www.aneel.gov.br/areaPerfil.cfm?
idPerfil=9 (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
Lei No. 9.427, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996. (Brazil).
82.
83.
The regulatory agencies' mission is defined in Article Three of Statute
9,427/96 and includes only microeconomic decisions. Id. art. 3.
Lei No. 4.595, de 31 de Dezembro de 1964, D.O.U. 31/12/1964 (Brazil);
84.
Decreto-Lei No. 200, de 25 de fevereiro de 1967, art. 189, D.O.U. 27/02/1967 (Brazil);
Decreto-Lei No. 278, de 28 de Fevereiro de 1967, art. 1.
85.
Although it seems counterintuitive to allow a regulatory agency to set up
rates that may impact inflation without taking inflation into consideration, this is what
actually happened in Brazil. The advantage of this system is that it reduces the
discretion of the regulatory agency, which protects the investors. The disadvantage is
that it creates problems of intra-governmental coordination, since the agency may be
impairing Central Bank efforts to control inflation levels.
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had strong reasons to halt rate increases and, as the initial
86
declarations show, intended to do so.
Although it is not possible to cite concrete evidence of
presidential influence in the general decision of ANEEL to limit rate
increases, there is at least one other episode that also suggests the
existence of Presidential influence over regulatory outcomes. This
episode involved a company called Centrais El6tricas de Pernambuco
(Celpe), the electricity distribution company for the state of
Pernambuco. In March 2005, Celpe asked for a 56.78% increase in its
rates.8 7 Celpe alleged that its costs had increased due to a power
purchase agreement signed in 2005.88 According to this contract,
Celpe stopped buying electricity from hydropower plants for 62.8
reais (R$62.8) per mega-watt hour (MWh) and started buying
electricity for R$137.3 per MWh from a thermal power generator
(Termopernambuco) 89 that belongs to the same corporate group that
controls Celpe (Neoenergia), and that started to operate in 2004.90
Although Celpe's expenses had increased by R$254.5 million a year,
that money turned into profit for the new thermal power generator,
thereby staying within the same entity and in the pockets of
Neoenergia shareholders. 91 Thus, an increase in rates to cover Celpe
expenses would yield higher profits to Neoenergia, the group that
92
owns Celpe and the thermal power plant.

The hypothesis that Lula's administration was trying to control
86.
infrastructure rates due to macroeconomic concerns would also explain why the
attempts to influence independent agencies were mostly centered on electricity and
telecommunications. The rates in these two infrastructure sectors have a high impact
on inflation levels and also on other macroeconomic policies. Humberto Medina,
Governo Ndo Sabe Como "Regular"as Ag6ncias [Government Does Not Know How to
"Regulate" the Agencies], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Mar. 24, 2003, at B5.
87.
ANEEL, Aneel Apresenta Revisdo Tarifiria da Celpe (PE) em Audigncia
Pdblica [ANEEL Submits Celp6 Tariff Review To Notice and Comments] (Mar. 13,
2005), available at http://www.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/noticias/Output-Noticias.cfm?
Identidade=1403&idarea=90.
88.
Id.
89.
ANEEL, Proposta de Revisdo Tarifdria da Celpe Vai e Audi~ncia Ptiblica
[Celpe's Tariff Review Is Available for Notice and Comments], BOLETIM ENERGIA, No.
165 (Mar. 31-Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.aneel.gov.br/arquivos/PDF/boletim165.htm
(last visited Feb. 16, 2008) [hereinafter ANEEL Boletim No. 165].
90.
Leila Coimbra, Aneel Deve Mudar o Atual Modelo de Revisdo Tarifdria
[ANEEL Must Change the Current Model of Tariff Revision], VALOR ECONOMICO (Sdo
Paulo), Mar. 11, 2005.
Id.
91.
92.
This type of transaction (called self-dealing) is now forbidden in the
Brazilian system, but at the time the prohibition was enacted, the government decided
not to make it retroactive. See Coimbra, supra note 90 (noting that these self-dealing
contracts "were banned in the new model of the electric industry" but that "the
contracts already signed could not be broken"). Thus, the pre-existing contracts, like
this one, remained valid.
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President Lula and the Minister of Energy tried to convince the
agency to reject Celpe's request. 93 Public servants, who prefer to
remain anonymous, said that the government asked ANEEL not to
grant an increase of more than 25% to Celpe. 94 ANEEL declared that
without the expenses incurred pursuant to the power purchase
agreement, Celpe would be entitled to an increase of 21.05%. 9 5 In the
end, ANEEL decided to (1) limit it to an increase of 24.43% in 2005
and (2) grant an additional increase of 12.5% in the next three years
as a rollover of the adjustment to which it was entitled in 2005. 9 6 The
first part of the decision is in line with governmental preferences, but
it is unclear whether the second part could also be. If the government
was merely concerned about meeting inflation targets in 2005, it
might well be the case that it is. If the government did not want to
reward a self-dealing arrangement, then the second portion of the
decision would be contrary to governmental preferences.
Given the special circumstances of Celpe's review, it is unclear if
the outcome was determined by presidential influence over the
agency, or whether the agency came to this decision on its own. In
this regard, the sources' anonymity makes it hard to evaluate if the
information is reliable. In fact, contrary to the information provided
by the anonymous sources, the government has denied any
involvement. 9 7 The chairman of ANEEL, in contrast, has indicated
that the "administration has certain concerns as regards the levels of
increase of regulated prices," but he has also denied that the
Executive branch interfered with matters under ANEEL's
98
jurisdiction.
All these examples suggest that there might be Executive
influence over ANEEL. To be sure, there is a fine line between
determinant influence over the agency to implement Executive
preferences, and an autonomous decision on the part of the agency to

93.

Mercado Aberto-Reajuste em PE Inquieta Setor El~trico [Price Adjustment

in Pernambuco Upsets the Electricity Sector], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, May 2, 2005.
94.
Coimbra, supra note 90.
ANEEL Boletim No. 165, supra note 89.
95.
96.
ANEEL, Res. 112/05 (Nov. 24, 2004).
97.
Coimbra, supra note 90. The Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Mines
and Energy denied any governmental interference in the process, and stated that the
rate review was within the competence of the regulatory agency. Id.
See Coimbra, supra note 90 (reporting these statements made by the
98.
director-general of ANEEL). Edvaldo A. Santana (director of ANEEL) called the
Author's attention to the fact that the government was certainly concerned with
inflation, but that there are more interests at stake than the ones portrayed in the
newspapers reports: the public prosecutors office (Ministdrio Pziblico Federal de
Pernambuco)is suing the regulatory agency for approving the contract between Celpe
and Termonopernambuco (by July 20, 2006 there was no final decision yet although
ANEEL had won some appeals). According to Mr. Santana, the fact that there was a
judicial action in progress at the time raised more speculation about this decision.
Besides, ANEEL's decision in this case was not unanimous (it was 4-1). E-mail
interview with Edvaldo A. Santana, Dir., ANEEL (June 26, 2006).
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consider the government's preferences before enacting new
regulation. The variables considered here do not allow a firm
conclusion as to which side of the line ANEEL falls, but its position is
in sharp contrast with the one taken by ANATEL, the
telecommunications agency. ANATEL's reaction to the same proposal
of halting rate increases is discussed below; it shows resistance on the
side of the agency to cooperate with the Lula administration.
B. Increases in TelecommunicationsRates
Similar to the declarations in the electricity sector, in April 2003
Lula's chief of staff (Chefe da Casa Civil), Jos6 Dirceu, declared that
the government wanted to negotiate with telecommunications
companies, settling on a reduced increase in their rates that would
not violate contractual and statutory provisions.9 9
One month later, the Minister of Telecommunications, Miro
Teixeira, formulated a proposal that would modify the inflation index
used to adjust telecommunication rates. 10 0 The adjustment would be
according to a consumer price index (IPCA) instead of a general price
index (IGP-DI).10 1 This change would generate a lower level of
increase in telecommunications rates. 10 2 In fact, at the time the
proposal was made, the consumer price index indicated inflation of
17%, while the general price index was indicating a rate of 32%.103
The proposal, however, encountered fierce resistance even inside the

99.
D'Ercole, supra note 55.
100.
See World Dialogue on Regulation for Network Economies, Brazil:
OperatorsAgree To Delay Price Increases, July 7, 2004, http://www.regulateonline.org/
2003/inteleconl2004/July/A-Brazil-040707.htm
(noting the dispute between Miro
Teixeira at the Ministry of Communications and Anatel over rate changes).
101.
The IPCA (indice de pregos ao consumidor amplo) measures the variation of
prices of products consumed by families that have a certain level of monthly income
(one to forty times the minimum wage) and is calculated by IBGE. Instituto Brasileiro
de Geografia e Estatistica, Indice Nacional de Preqos ao Consumidor Amplo-IPCA e
Indice Nacional de Preqos ao Consumidor, http://www.ibge.gov.brfhome/estatistica
indicadores/precos/inpc-ipcadefaultinpc.shtm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008). The general
price index (IGP-DI) measures the variation of the prices that directly affect the
economic activity in the country and is calculated by FGV. Fundaq~o Getulio Vargas,
indices Gerais de Pregos, http://www.fgv.br/dgdlasp/dsp-Janela.asp?conteudo=dspIGPDI_10-M.asp Both are important indexes to measure levels of inflation. (last
visited Feb 19, 2008).
102.
Editoriais, Guerra das Tarifas [Tariffs War], FOLHA DE S.PAULO, July 7,
2004.
103.
Patricia Zimmerman, Governo quer que reajuste de telefones agora ndo
supere 17,24% [The Government Wants Price Increases to be Capped at 17,24%],
FOLHA ONLINE, BRASILIA, June 23, 2003; Patricia Zimmerman, Teles participam de
reunido sobre tarifas corn ministros [Telecommunication Companies Meet with
Ministers to Discuss Rates], FOLHA ONLINE, BRASiLIA, June 10, 2003.
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government because some believed that it would imply breaching
104
statutory provisions and concession contracts.
The President then presented a new proposal limiting the 2003
increases to 17% and rolling over the remaining percentage to the
next three years.' 0 5 In other words, the government's proposal was
10 6
similar to the policy adopted by ANEEL in the electricity sector.
ANATEL, however, did not accept the government's proposal. 10 7 In
contrast to the case of the electricity sector, the final regulatory
outcome was not the one proposed by the government. ANATEL
granted rate increases by adjusting rates to inflation according to the
general price index (IGP-DI). l0 8
As a result of this decision,
telecommunications rates experienced an average increase of 28.7%,
and some services had increases of up to 41.75%.109
Why did ANATEL resist the government proposal while ANEEL
did not? On the one hand, these different reactions might be a result
of two independent decisions by ANEEL and ANATEL to interact
with the government in a cooperative and confrontational way,
respectively. On the other hand, they can also be interpreted as a
sign that ANATEL was better able than ANEEL to resist
governmental
pressure
given
its stronger
guarantees
of
independence.
Below, Parts IV and V argue that ANATEL has
stronger institutional guarantees of independence and that this may
have contributed to its differing reaction.
C. More Recent Instances of PresidentialInfluence on Regulation
The rate-increase cases suggest that the level of presidential
influence over ANEEL and ANATEL is different, but this is not to say
that the President has a weak influence on ANATEL. In fact, there
are instances in which Lula's administration successfully interfered
with a regulation's content in both the telecommunications and the
electricity sectors. One such case in each sector will be analyzed
below.

104.
Kennedy Alencar & Humberto Medina, Reajuste de Teles Op6e Miro a
Dirceu e Palocci [Increase in Telecommunications Rates Is Disputed by Ministers],
FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Mar. 31, 2003, at B15.

105.

Anatel Ignora Pedido de Lula e dd Aumento de 28,75% a Telefdnicas

[Anatel Ignores Presidential Request and Increases Telephone Tariffs to 28.75%], 0
ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, June 27, 2003, at 1, B1, B3.
106.
See supra Part III.A.

107.

Anatel Ignora Pedido de Lula e dd Aumento de 28,75% a Telef6nicas, supra

note 105, at 1, B1, B3.
108.
Id. at 1, B3.

109.

Id. at 1, B1, B3; FracassaAcordo Sobre Tarifa de Telefone ati 41,75%

[Negotiated Compromise Fails and Telephone Service Tariffs Increase up to 41.75%],
FOLHADE SAO PAULO, June 26, 2003, at 1, B1, B2.
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In 2005, the Lula administration began implementing a new
system of public bids for the sale of "new electricity," or electricity
produced by new power plants. 110 Before the public bids, ANEEL was
in charge of issuing new regulations to specify some details of the
deals."' One aspect of these regulations concerned unforeseeable
costs.112 For instance, the costs of hydroelectric power plants would
significantly increase if, during the construction of a dam,
archeological artifacts or endangered species of plants were found in
an area that was supposed to be inundated and, as a consequence, the
environmental regulator (or any other governmental body) revised
the terms of the license to build the dam. 113 This would delay the
construction schedule and significantly increase the investment's
costs. 114 In its original draft for the regulation (minuta do edital da
licitagdo), ANEEL decided that, in these cases, unforeseeable costs
could be transferred into the final rate (once they had been audited
and approved), thus being ultimately transferred to consumers. 115
One day after the regulation's draft was publicized, the Ministry
of Mines and Energy enacted a decree officially instructing ANEEL to
modify the regulation's term. 116 The directors 1 7 of ANEEL decided to
follow the guidelines given by the Ministry and revised the
regulation's draft. 118 Under the new regulation, the investors will
bear the risks and unforeseeable costs of these new projects. 119
The questions that remain open are whether the government had
the right to set up these guidelines, and more importantly, whether
ANEEL had to follow them. Under the relevant statutory provisions,
ANEEL has the jurisdiction to regulate public bids for new projects,
but it should do so according to the guidelines defined by the
Ministry. 120 The challenge here is to define what is legitimate or

110.
Daniel Rittner, Diverg~ncias entre Governo e Aneel Prejudicam Leildo
[Disagreements Between the Government and Aneel Harm Auction], VALOR
ECONOMICO (Sao Paulo), Dec. 16, 2005. This system of public bids replaced the original
privatization plan, and was designed to attract more investments to the generation
sector.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Portaria Res. No. 515, Gabinete do Ministro (Oct. 26, 2005).
114.
Id.
115.
Rittner, supra note 110.
116.
Portaria Res. No. 515, Gabinete do Ministro (Oct. 26, 2005).
117.
This Article will use the word director to refer to the agencies' primary
decision makers because this is the term used in Brazil (diretor).
118.
Rittner, supra note 110.
119.
ANEEL, Edital de Leildo No. 002/2005, Anexo 2, art. 8, item 11 (2005).
120.
See Lei No. 9.427, art.2, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996.
(Brazil) (stating that ANEEL will regulate the electricity sector according to the
policies and guidelines defined by the Federal administration); id. at art. 3 (stating
that ANEEL should promote public bids according to the plans and guidelines of the
Federal administration). It is important to note that Article Three was actually an
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illegitimate political interference in an agency that is supposed to be
independent, but operates under such a provision.
ANATEL faced a similar situation in 2006. For some time,
consumers have requested minute rates for telephone calls, instead of
pulse rates. 121 The main reason for the request was that minute rate
telephone bills would discriminate in more detail between the
number of calls and their duration, increasing the bills' transparency
and the consumers' knowledge about their own consumption
habits. 122 In 2003, President Lula enacted a decree to implement this
change starting in 2006.123
In connection with the Presidential decree, in 2005 ANATEL
enacted a regulation determining the details of the shift and
declaring a rate increase in the new system. 124 The minute rate
would not simply be a division of the current rate by the number of
minutes included in a pulse. 125 In the old system, each pulse was
four minutes (240 seconds), and consumers would pay the same
126
amount regardless of the length of their call (one or four minutes).
In the new system, the consumer would pay less than he would have
in the old system for a call that takes anything from one second to
three minutes. For conversations longer than four minutes, however,
the consumer would pay more than she would have in the old system.
The telecommunications agency based the rate increase on an
empirical study analyzing two hundred million phone calls in
Brazil. 127 The study shows that most of the local phone calls are
shorter than three minutes. 128 According to the agency, this study

amendment to the original statutory provision implemented by Statute 10,848/04,
Article 9. See Lei No. 10.848/04, art. 2, para. 11, available at http://www6.senado.
gov.br/legislacao/ListaPublicacoes.action?id=238459.
See Assessoria de Imprensa da Secretaria da Justiga e da Defesa da
121.
Cidadania, Procon-SPDiscute Telefonia [Procon-SP Discusses Telephony], Apr. 5, 2005,
http://www.procon.sp.gov.br/noticia.asp?id=69 (last visited Feb. 16, 2008) (noting that
ANATEL's change from charging per pulse to charging per minute was so that the
consumers were heard).
Id.; IDEC, Adiamento da conversdo do pulso para minuto: o que o Idec acha
122.
disso?, TELEFONIA E TELECOMUNICAQOES [Telephony and Telecommunications], Feb.
22, 2006, http://www.idec.org.br/emacao.asp?id=1093 (last visited Feb.16, 2008).
Decreto No. 4.733, de 10 de junho DE 2003, D.O.U. de 10.6.2003. (Brazil).
123.
124.
Ag~ncia Nacional de Telecomunicagbes, Res. No. 423, de 6 de dezembro de
2005 (Brazil).
Id.
125.
126.
The system was more complicated than that, since the division of pulses
was defined randomly. Thus, a two minute phone call could be charged two pulses if
the call started at the last minute of one pulse, and ended in the first minute of the
next pulse. IDEC, Telefonia fixa: mudan~a de pulso para minuto torna cobranga mais
transparente, mas vein acompanhada de aumento de tarifa, TELEFONIA E
TELECOMUNICACOES, December 8, 2005, http://www.idec.org.br/emacao.asp?id=1056#
(last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
127.
IDEC, Adiamento da conversdo do pulso para minuto: o que o Idec acha
disso?, supra note 122.
Id.
128.
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showed that the new system (with the rate increase) benefits most
Brazilian consumers. 129 However, it is hard to evaluate the grounds
for the decision because ANATEL did not make available the
empirical study upon which the rate increase is based.
The consumers requested that the shift from pulse rates to
minute rates be implemented without the rate increase proposed by
ANATEL.1 30 According to them, the new rate for a fifteen minute
phone call would represent an increase of 144% over the old rate.13 1
In February 2006, the Lula administration decided to postpone
for one year the implementation of the shift from pulses to
minutes. 132 In the press conference, government representatives
announced that they were concerned by the fact that consumers with
dial-up Internet connections would pay much more under the new
system, which would conflict with the government's digital inclusion
133
policies.
ANATEL had initially supported the shift, and even conducted a
study to provide an empirical basis for its implementation. 134 Despite
the initial support, however, the agency did not resist the
governmental decision to postpone its implementation. 135
One
hypothesis to explain this lack of reaction is that the agency later
realized that a substantial number of consumers would be affected by
the new system and the rate increase (especially dial-up Internet
users, who might not have been considered in ANATEL's empirical

129.
Ana Paula Ribeiro, Ligagdo curta fica mais barata e telefonemas longos
mais caros em 2006 [Short phone calls become cheapter and long ones more expensive
in 2006], FOLHA ONLINE, BRASiLIA, December 7, 2005; Patricia Zimmerman, Conversdo
pulso paraminuto 6 vantajosapara 28% dos usudrios [Shift from pulse rates to minute
rates is benefitial to 28% of consumers], FOLHA ONLINE, BRASILIA, Mar. 14, 2007.
According to ANATEL, 48.64% of consumers will see no difference and only 23% might
lose.
130.
Assessoria de Imprensa da Secretaria da Justi4a e da Defesa da Cidadania,
supra note 121; IDEC, Adiamento da conversdo do pulso para minuto: o que o Idec acha
disso?, supranote 122.
131.
IDEC, Adiamento da conversdo do pulso para minuto: o que o Idec acha
disso?, supra note 122; see also IDEC, Telefonia fixa: mudanva de pulso para minuto
torna cobranga mais transparente,mas vem acompanhadade aumento de tarifa , supra
note 126 (providing a detailed analysis of the increases and their impact on
consumers).
132.
Carlos Eduardo Zanatta, Suspensdo da Conversdo Pulso-Minuto Coloca
Politica em Xeque [Transition Between Pulse-Minute System Puts Politics Under
Strain], TELETIME NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://www.fndc.org.br/
internas.php?p=noticias&cont-key=18493.
133.
Id.
134.
See IDEC, Adiamento da conversdo do pulso para minuto: o que o Idec acha
disso?, supra note 122; see also text accompanying supra note 127.
135.
In a meeting, the Minister of Telecommunications and the President's Chief
of Staff (Chefe da Casa Civil) informed three directors of ANATEL, including the
president of the agency, of the decision to postpone the implementation of the policy
without eliciting any reaction. Zanatta, supra note 132.
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study). Thus, the agency could have by itself reached the conclusion
that it was in fact better to postpone the policy's implementation.
Another plausible hypothesis is that the agency is no longer
independent from the government. This hypothesis can be supported
by a number of factors. First, Lula appointed two of the three
directors who participated in the meeting where the decision was
made. 136 Second, the government was one of the stakeholders most
interested in postponing the policy's implementation. In fact, in
addition to the concern with digital inclusion policies, the government
could have been concerned with the impact of this rate increase on
inflation. 13 7 Whereas the government had at least two reasons to
postpone the policy's implementation, the consumers remained in
favor of the shift (although opposed to the rate increase), and some
companies had already spent substantial amounts of money since
2003 to make the necessary changes to the new systemi 3 8 Thus,
except for the government, there were many stakeholders who
wanted the shift.
Also, there is at least one piece of evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that ANATEL is no longer independent: in April 2006, two
months after the decision to postpone the shift, ANATEL proposed an
alternative solution that would create a transitional period that
would spare Internet users. 139 The proposal, however, did not come

136.
The following directors attended the meeting: Plinio de Aguiar, Pedro
Jaime Ziller, and Luiz Alberto da Silva. The first two were appointed by Lula in 2004;
the latter was appointed by Cardoso in 2002. See Decretos de 4 de Novembro de 2004,
D.O.U. de 5.11.2004. (Brazil) (appointing Plinio de Aguiar to Anatel); Decretos de 6 de
Janeiro de 2004, D.O.U. de 6.1.2004. (Brazil) (appointing Pedro Jaime Ziller de Aradijo
to Anatel); Decretos de 16 de Abril de 2002, D.O.U. de 16.4.2002. (Brazil) (appointing
Luiz Alberto da Silva to Anatel).
But see Suspensdo de Regras paraNova Conta do Telefone ndo 6 Quebra de
137.
Contrato, diz Hilio Costa [Suspension of Rules for New Account of the Phone Is Not
Breach of Contract, Says H6lio Costa], VALOR ONLINE, Feb. 22, 2006,
(last
http://noticias.uol.com.br/economia/ultnot/valor/2006/02/22/ult1913u46665.jhtm
visited Feb. 20, 2008) (reporting that in response to a question in the press conference,
the minister of telecommunications also said that the decision to postpone was not
related to concerns with inflation, despite the fact that days before the announcement,
the Minister of Finance met with a group of representatives from research institutes
that calculate inflation indexes in order to evaluate the impact of the rate increase).
The President of one of the biggest groups in the telecommunications sector
138.
in Brazil (Telef6nica) advocated for the implementation of the policy only a few hours
after the Minister announced the governmental decision to postpone it. Fernando
Xavier Defende Cobranqapor Minuto [Fernando Xavier Defends Charges per Minute],
REUTERS, Feb. 22, 2006.
139.
Patricia Zimmermann, Anatel Aprova Plano para ndo Encarecer Internet
Corn Jim dos Pulsos [Anatel Approves Proposal That Will Not Increase Costs for
19,
2006,
SAO
PAULO
ONLINE,
Apr.
Internet
Users],
FOLHA
DE
http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91ulO6993.shtml.
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Instead, it was a public policy defined by the

D. Investors'Perceptionsof PresidentialInfluence on IRAs
In sum, there are reasons to believe that there is increasing
presidential influence on regulatory agencies in Brazil in both the
electricity and telecommunications sectors. This view is supported by
investor perceptions. Recall that IRAs were implemented in Brazil to
create a safer environment for investors. 142 Thus, it is worth asking if
investors' perception of the independence of regulatory agencies
coincide with the case-study evidence. Two research reports by the
American Chamber of Commerce in Brazil (Amcham - SP) indicate
that in 2004 and 2005 at least half of the investors in the electricity
sector perceived the regulatory agency (ANEEL) to be excessively or
highly influenced by the Executive branch. 14 3 The same result
144
appeared in the research report for the telecommunications sector.
Amcham's reports on ANEEL 145 describe survey responses of
investors, consumers, and electric sector associations. 146 One of the

140.
Id,
141.
Id.
142.
See supra Part II for a more detailed analysis.
143.
The 2003 report did not address the governmental interference in the
agency and for this reason will not be explored here. See CAMARA AMERICANA DE
COMPRCIO DE SAO PAULO-AMCHAM-SP, RELAT6RIO SOBRE A AGftNCIA NACIONAL DE
ENERGIA ELtITRIcA-ANEEL [REPORT ON THE ELECTRICITY AGENCY] (2003).
144.
See CAMARA AMERICANA DE COMPRCIO DE SAO PAULO-AMCHAM-SP,
RELAT6RIO SOBRE A AGftNCIA NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICAQOES-ANATEL [REPORT ON
THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AGENCY]
(2005)
[hereinafter
AMCHAM
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGENCY REPORT 2005]; CAMARA AMERICANA DE COM9RCIO DE
SAo
PAULO-AMCHAM-SP,
RELAT6RIO
SOBRE
A
AGfPNCIA
NACIONAL
DE
TELECOMUNICACOES-ANATEL [REPORT ON THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGENCY] (2004)

[hereinafter AMCHAM TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGENCY REPORT 2004].
145.
Amcham has published reports on ANEEL for 2004, 2005, and 2006. See
infra note 146.
146.
See CAMARA AMERICANA DE COMitRCIO DE SAO PAULo-AMCHAM-SP,
RELAT6RIO SOBRE A AGtNCIA NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ELTRICA-ANEEL [REPORT ON
THE ELECTRICITY AGENCY] (2006) [hereinafter AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY REPORT

2006],
available at
http://www.amcham.com.br/update/2007/update2OO7-0205a_dtml.pdf; CAMARA AMERICANA DE COMtRCIO DE SAo PAULO-AMCHAM-SP,
RELAT6RIO SOBRE A AGtNCIA NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ELPTRICA-ANEEL [REPORT ON
THE ELECTRICITY AGENCY] (2005) [hereinafter AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY REPORT
2005]; CAMARA AMERICANA DE COMtRCIO DE SAO PAULO-AMCHAM-SP, RELAT6RIO
SOBRE A AGtNCIA NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ELItTRICA-ANEEL [REPORT ON THE
ELECTRICITY AGENCY] (2004) [hereinafter AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY REPORT 2004].

The consumers comprised only industrial consumers, not residential consumers. In
2004, there were seventeen companies that responded to the questionnaires. These
companies represent 65% of all distribution companies, 55% of all transmission
companies, and 40% of all generation companies. See AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY
REPORT 2006; AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY REPORT 2004.
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questions was: "[wihat is the level of interference of the
administration, through the Ministries, in the regulatory decisions
and actions, as well as in the oversight functions of ANEEL? '147 The
possible responses were: excessive, high, medium, low, and
minimum. 148
In 2004, 50% of the participants considered the
interference "excessive" or "high," whereas the other 50% considered
it "medium" or "low."'1 49 Nobody (0%) said "minimum." 150 In 2005,
65.4% of the respondents said that the interference was either
"excessive" or "high," and 34.6% said it was "medium." Nobody (0%)
chose "low" or "minimum. ' 15 1 In sum, the responses indicate a yearto-year strengthening in the perception that the administration was
interfering with ANEEL's regulatory functions.
There was only one report, in 2005, addressing the issue of
political influence over the telecommunications agency. 152 The
question in the questionnaire read: "[i]n your opinion, has ANATEL
suffered from political interferences?"' 1 3 There were four options for
the answer: always, often, seldom, and never. 154 In 2005, 45.45% of
the respondents indicated "always," whereas 40.91% indicated
"often."15 5
Thus, investor perceptions are in line with what the Author's
analysis of the cases suggests: ANATEL and ANEEL are subject to
significant presidential influence.
The results, however, do not
indicate whether ANATEL is generally regarded as more
independent than ANEEL, since the respondents were investors and
companies operating in each sector.
E. Conclusions
Now that both the existence of presidential influence and its
perception by investors have been documented, it is important to
consider how this level of influence was achieved.
Given that
Brazilian IRAs share many of the structural characteristics of IRAs
in developed countries, why were they not more independent? Parts
IV and V suggest that the details of the agencies' institutional design

147.

AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY REPORT 2005, supra note 146, at 40; AMCHAM

ENERGY AGENCY REPORT 2004, supra note 146, at 32.
148.

AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY REPORT 2005, supra note 146, at 40; AMCHAM

ENERGY AGENCY REPORT 2004, supra note 146, at 32.
149.

AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY REPORT 2004, supra note 146, at 54.

150.
The responses were excessive (33.33%), high (16.67%), medium (33.33%),
and low (16.67%).
None of the respondents said the interference qualified as
minimum. Id. at 54.
151.
Id. at 57.
152.
AMCHAM ENERGY AGENCY REPORT 2005, supra note 146.
153.
Id.at 49.
154.
Id. at 49
155.
Id. at 80.
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are a plausible explanation for the behavior analyzed in these
concrete episodes. The case study evidence presented above is
consistent with the institutional analysis developed in the remainder
of the Article. Moreover, the institutional analysis also helps explain
why, in the Brazilian context, ANEEL and ANATEL have different
156
levels of independence.

IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CREATION OF INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY AGENCIES

The institutional designs of Brazilian IRAs vary, especially in
the telecommunications and electricity sectors, despite the fact that
creating a secure environment for private investment was the
predominant reason why Brazil implemented IRAs in both sectors.
Part IV demonstrates that circumstantial factors caused the design of
these two agencies to be quite different. The different institutional
designs will serve as a basis for the analysis developed in the
following Part of the Article (Part V).
In line with the international discourse and trends, President
Cardoso (1995-2002) announced a plan to replace the existing
157
bureaucratic structure with an independent regulatory structure.
The ministry of each sector was then assigned the task of formulating
the new regulatory agency's structure for that particular sector. 158
This assignment was made without an overarching plan, a more
detailed discussion about what should be achieved, or even a clear
idea of the general principles that should guide the creation of these
160
IRAs. 159 This was especially true for the electricity sector.

156.
To be sure, more work needs to be done to reach firm conclusions. The
concrete examples discussed in this Part do not eliminate the possibility that, broadly
speaking, the policy outcomes might have been products of factors other than executive
influence. However, the Author's analysis suggests that this is not the case.
157.
S~rgio H. Abranches, Reforma Regulat6ria: Conceitos, Experi6ncias e
Recomendag6es [Regulatory Reform: Concepts, Experiences, and Recommendations],
REVISTA DO SERVICO PUjBLICO, Apr.-June 1999, at 19-51.
158.
Id.
159.
See id. (pointing to the fact that a plan was lacking not only for the
agencies, but also for the regulatory framework in general); Edson Nunes et al.,
Ag~ncias Reguladorasno Brasil [Regulatory Agencies in Brazil], in LUcIA AVELAR AND
ANTONIO 0. CINTRA, SISTEMA POLITIcO BRASILEIRO: UMA INTRODUCAO 189 (2007)
(supporting this with a series of interviews with officials involved in the process);
Interview with Luis Antonio Ramos Veras, supra note 32.
160.
Joio Lizardo de Aradjo, The Case of Brazil: Reform by Trial and Error?, in
ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 565-94 (Fereidoon P.
Sioshansi & Wolfgang Pffanberger eds., 2006); see also Abranches, supra note 157, at
35.
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In each of the sectoral ministries, the specialized bureaucrats
managed the process of creating IRAs differently, leading to distinct
outcomes in telecommunications and electricity. In the electricity
sector, bureaucrats in charge of designing the agency rejected any
external advice, 16 1 and the bill prepared by them did not include
162
measures to secure the new regulatory agency's independence.
Instead, the bill would replace the existing regulatory body
(DepartamentoNacional de Aguas e Energia Eltricaor DNAEE) with
163
another non-independent entity.
The President did not want to implement a non-independent
body, but instead of having a confrontation with the specialized
164
bureaucracy, he decided to transfer the debate to Congress, 65
1
sending them a bill that included no guarantees of independence.
Before that, however, the President negotiated the bill's revision with
party leaders and assembled a coalition in Congress to implement the
166
changes that would make the regulatory agency independent.
Thus, the Congressional changes in the bill were actually a
Presidential initiative. 167 The bill was enacted as Statute 9,427/96,

Despite the fact that external consultants were involved, they were not able
161.
to influence the proposed design, and the bureaucracy retained the final word in the
process. For instance, the consulting firm Coopers and Lybrand was formally involved
in the process, and it highlighted its disagreement with the institutional design
proposed by the Ministry but was not able to implement changes. Interview with
Edvaldo Alves de Santana, Dir., ANEEL (Feb. 3 & July 20, 2006) (on file with author).
Also, some independent consultants were invited to discuss the proposal informally,
Id.
The most
but again, their suggestions were not taken into consideration.
influential players in this process were the bureaucrats of the previous regulatory
body, DNAEE. Three of them (Jos6 Mario Miranda Abdo, Luciano Pacheco, and
Eduardo Henrique Ellery Filho) became the first directors of ANEEL. Id. Other
people who were very influential in the process were Jos6 Said Brito (former director of
DNAEE, before Abdo), Peter Greiner (National Secretary of Energy), and Reginaldo
Medeiros (Chief of Staff of Greiner). Id.
162.
Representative Aleluia declared that the original bill proposed by the
executive branch was "timid" in guaranteeing independence. Nunes et al., supra note
159, at 192.
It would be an autarquia. Different from DNAEE, this new body would be
163.
located outside of the Minister, but would not necessarily have institutional guarantees
of independence to avoid political influence.
164.
Interview with Sergio Abranches (Nov. 2005) (on file with author).
Projeto de Lei No. 1.669/96 (Mensagem n. 234/96).
165.
See Interview with Sergio Abranches, supra note 164 (reporting a private
166.
conversation with Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1996).
167.
Representative Jos6 Carlos Aleluia, from one of the parties of the governing
coalition, drafted the new version that would guarantee the agency's independence.
The reports of the discussions in the House of Representatives show that the author of
the reforms, Representative Aleluia, was in close consultation with the Cardoso
Administration. DIARIO DA CAMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, July 25, 1996, at 21155-61,
available at http://www2.camara.gov.br/publicacoes; see also Jos6 Carlos Aleluia,
Speech at the House of Representatives, July 9, 1996, in DiARIO DA CAMARA DOS
DEPUTADOS, July 10, 1996, at 19647; Jos6 Carlos Aleluia, Speech at the House of
Representatives, July 24, 1996, in DIARIO DA CAMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, July 25, 1996,
at 21177, 21185, available at http://www2.camara.gov.br/publicacoes.
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creating the Ag~ncia Nacional de Energia Eltrica (ANEEL) that
regulated the electricity sector.
In contrast with electricity, the telecommunications bill
submitted to Congress already guaranteed a very high level of
independence for the regulatory agency. 168 Two circumstantial
conditions largely contributed to this. First, the telecommunications
Minister took a strong leadership position in promoting the
reforms. 169 Second, the telecommunications bureaucracy was more
open to international trends and to external advice. 170 In fact, the
bureaucracy's leadership was actually supportive of the privatization
171
reforms and advocated for an IRA in the sector.
The telecommunications bill also underwent a different approval
process in Congress.
A permanent congressional commission
evaluated the electricity agency bill; a special commission evaluated
the telecommunications agency bill. 172
Whereas the special
commissions are nominated by the major parties (those in the
173
governmental coalition), the permanent commissions are not.
Accordingly, while the electricity agency bill was subject to a number
of amendments in Congress, the bill creating a telecommunications
agency was approved without many modifications to the original
version prepared by the Executive. 174 Thus, although the electricity
agency was designed in a piecemeal process that did not necessarily
contribute to the overall integration of all institutional guarantees of
independence, the institutional design implemented in the
telecommunications sector was much more coherent.

168.
The bill proposed by the executive branch was PL 2,648/96, which was
incorporated into an existing legislative proposal (PL 821/96) and later became Statute
9,472/97. Interview with Carlos Ari Sundfeld, supra note 29.
169.
Roger Marinzoli et al., Lessons of Telebras: The Leadership of Sergio Motta
(on file with author); see also Prata et al., supra note 31.
170.
Interview with Renato Guerreiro, supra note 29.
171.
Interview with Carlos Ari Sundfeld, supra note 29; Interview with Renato
Guerreiro, supra note 29. Guerreiro himself is the clearest example of that because he
was supportive of privatization reforms. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. In
the telecommunications sector, the bureaucrats not only had a lot of contact with
international institutions and were aware of international trends in the sector, but
they also knew that a process of privatization would not threaten their jobs. Interview
with Sergio Abranches, supra note 164. This was not necessarily the same in the
electricity sector. Privatization brought the threat of a potential shift from hydro
generation to thermo generation, a technology that was not the expertise of the
specialized bureaucracy. Also, in the pre-privatization period, these bureaucrats, who
alternated between periods in government offices and periods in state-owned
companies, dominated the regulatory bodies. Id. Many resisted privatization and
independent agencies because both would cause them to lose power in the sector. Id.
The Author is grateful to Sergio H. Abranches for calling her attention to this point.
172.
Nunes et al., supra note 159, at 191.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. at 194-95.
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Why did the process leading to the approval of the
telecommunications bill in Congress differ so much from that of the
electricity bill? For one, Telecommunications Minister Sergio Motta
used a very effective strategy to get the bill approved: he designed a
1 75
coherent and comprehensive regulatory framework for the sector
and backed up the bill with strong political support so that it could
resist the different (and often conflicting) demands of interest groups
in Congress.
In the case of electricity, in contrast, the regulatory agency was
created before the regulatory framework was established. 176 While
Sergio Motta was able to argue that the telecommunications bill was
a "package" in which every single provision regarding the agency's
design was essential for the sector's functioning, in the electricity
sector there was no indication of why a certain aspect of the agency's
177
design could not be modified.
In addition, the Telecommunications Minister was regarded as
the second most powerful person in the government, after President
Cardoso. 178 Thus, despite the fact that different interest groups made
conflicting demands regarding the regulatory agency's design, the
Minister was able to impose what he thought was the best option for
the sector or what the specialized bureaucracy and consultants
proposed as such. In contrast, the process was not centralized in the
case of ANEEL. 179 In fact, there were two different Ministers of
Energy between 1995 and 1998, and neither of them had expertise in
the electricity sector or had any influence over the specialized
bureaucracy.' 8 0 Consequently, the regulatory agency's design was a
compromise between the interests of two groups-the politicians and
81
the bureaucracy.1

175.
The regulatory agency for telecommunications was part of a broader bill,
which had a complete design of the regulatory framework for the whole sector. The bill
that created the telecommunications agency was later named the General
Telecommunications Law since it included the most important regulatory provisions of
the sector as a whole.
176.
The regulatory framework for the electricity sector was enacted in May
1998. Lei No. 9.648, de 27 de Maio de 1998, D.O.U. de 27.5.1998. (Brazil).
177.
Interview with Edvaldo Alves de Santana, Dir., ANEEL, to Author (June
26, 2006).
178.
Prata et al, supra note 31, at 83, 96, 102; see also Telephone interview with
Guerreiro, supra note 32.
179.
Decentralization means that there is a bargaining process such that that no
one member of the groups is able to impose his preferences (as Motta did in the
telecommunications sector), which in turn results in a compromise design. In a
centralized process, the political group conducting the process is powerful enough to
overshadow the divergences. Interview with Edvaldo Alves de Santana, supra note
177.

180.
Raimundo Brito (Jan. 1995 to Dec. 1998) and Rodolpho Tourinho Neto (Jan.
1999 to Feb. 2001). Id.
181.
Of the politicians, the most active player was representative Aleluia, who
was the leader of the government coalition in Congress and had some expertise in the
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Although the creation processes for the agencies in each of these
sectors differed substantially from each other, both processes were
guided by a concern for attracting investment.18 2 Thus, IRAs were
conceived as a mechanism to secure so-called regulatory commitment
and attract investment in Brazil, but circumstantial factors caused
the electricity and telecommunications sectors to give effect to this
concern in different ways. This explains many of the institutional
differences that exist between the agencies for these sectors,
discussed in greater detail in Part V.

V. THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES

Regulatory agencies are considered independent when they have
certain institutional features that insulate their decision-making
process from political actors (especially the President, as discussed in
Part II above).
Lack of removal power (the President or another executive
official is deprived of the power to remove these agencies' directors
once they are appointed) 8 3 is a central institutional guarantee of
independence.1 8 4 The removal power is a threat to agencies' decisionmaking freedom. If a President has this power, he can remove those

electricity sector. Id. Of the bureaucracy, the main players were the members of the
former regulatory body, especially those who later became directors of the regulatory
agency. See Interview with Edvaldo Alves de Santana, supra note 177; see also supra
note 161 and accompanying text.
182.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
183.
Normally, the expression used in statutes is removal only for "cause"
because the President lacks power to remove directors at will, but the directors can still
be removed through an administrative or judicial process for misconduct. For instance,
the telecommunications agency in Brazil was originally governed by the following
provision: "The members of the Board of Directors will only lose their office by virtue of
resignation, of final judicial decision or of administrative disciplinary proceedings." Lei
No. 9.472, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997. (Brazil). The Article uses the
expression 'lack of removal power" because of its primary concern with the President.
184.
Often the lack of removal power by the President is considered the most
important institutional criterion to evaluate independence.
See Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2247 (2000) (defining
independent agencies as agencies whose heads the President may not remove at will);
Geoffrey Miller, The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence,
1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 216 ("The distinguishing feature of [independent] agencies is that
their principal officers are protected against presidential removal at will."); Alan B.
Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Agencies?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252, 252
("There is no official definition of an independent agency... but for me an independent
agency is one whose members may not be removed by the President except for cause.").
To consider it the most important criterion, however, suggests that there is a clear-cut
choice between making an agency independent or not, and falsely simplifies the process
of making that choice.
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who might make decisions that displease him. This possibility of
dismissal can be an incentive for the directors of agencies to act in
accordance with presidential preferences. Therefore, the removal
power can function as a directive or a coercive influence over
agencies.
There are other ways to limit presidential influence.' 8 5 For
instance, it is easier to influence one director than it is to influence a
commission that makes collegial decisions. It is even harder to
influence this commission if the current President did not appoint
any of its members. Because of this, agencies can be equipped with
institutional features that help to enhance their independence, such
as collegiate decision-making and staggered and predefined terms of
86
office.'
Another example of the President's coercive powers relates to
financial autonomy. If the Executive branch can control the agency's
The power to
budget, the President may control the agency.
undermine an agency's financial stability and viability might be
analogous to the power to dismiss the agency's directors. Thus, one of
the institutional guarantees of independence is alternative sources of
income versus fiscal resources controlled by the Executive.
Each institutional feature is important, but by itself it could not
completely insulate regulatory agencies from presidential politics.
Collectively, however, the features work together to increase the
degree of independence in regulatory agencies. As a result, the more
institutional guarantees an agency has, the higher its degree of
independence will be.
These institutional features help to insulate regulatory agencies
from the political sphere. Yet, it is not only the existence of these
features that affects the degree of independence of agencies: the ways
in which these guarantees of independence are designed and work in
practice are also important.
As to the design, the specifics of the organizational structure of
an agency could be constructed in such a way as to either mitigate or
augment presidential power. Take, for instance, the length of the
terms of office for regulatory agencies' directors. One cannot consider
agencies that have two-year terms of office and those that have
lifetime appointments as equally independent. Longer terms of office
should guarantee a higher degree of independence because the
directors have fewer incentives to follow presidential preferences.

185.

Peter Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A

ConstitutionalAnalysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 600 (1989); Dan Wood & Richard

Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
801,801 (1991).
For example of many U.S. authors who have recognize this, see Miller,
186.
supra note 184; Morrison, supra note 184; and Shane, supra note 185.
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In addition to the design, these guarantees need to have
effectiveness.
The existence of an institutional guarantee of
independence does not ensure that it will, in fact, insulate the agency
from presidential influence.' 8 7 In some cases, the President can find
ways to weaken these guarantees. A clear example is the financial
autonomy of agencies, which is guaranteed by alternative sources of
income. This guarantee might become ineffective if the alternative
sources of income are distributed through an appropriations process
that is controlled by the Executive branch.
In this case, the
guarantee exists and is designed to ensure independence, but it is not
completely effective because it is not adjusted to other features of the
88
political and legal system.'
In sum, regulatory agencies' degrees of independence can be
determined by three factors: the existence of different institutional
guarantees of independence, the guarantees' design, and the
guarantees' effectiveness.18 9 Based on this threefold framework, the
following Subparts will analyze the following guarantees of
independence in the Brazilian scenario: appointment process and
removal power (Subpart A), chairman's appointment (Subpart B),
senatorial approval and partisan balance (Subpart C), the structure
of the council of directors (Subparts D and E), and financial autonomy
(Subpart F).
In analyzing each of these institutional features, the Article
provides a brief comparison with leading IRAs in the United States,
namely the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC), National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Although they do not perform the same functions
as the Brazilian agencies (not all American IRAs considered here deal
with economic regulation or infrastructure sectors), they have
institutional features to guarantee independence that were also
implemented in Brazil. By virtue of the institutional similarities
with the Brazilian IRAs, they provide an interesting point of

187.
For a study that highlights similar concerns in Europe and Africa, see
Katja Sander Johannsen, Regulatory Independence in Theory and Practice:A Survey of
Independent Energy Regulators in Eight European Countries 60 (Pub. Util. Research
Ctr., 2003), available at http://www.regulationbodyofknowledge.org/documents/031.pdf.
See also Eberhard, supra note 27, at 22-23.
188.
Eberhard, supra note 27, at 29; Johannsen, supra note 187, at 27.
189.
Fabrizio Gilardi, Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent
Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis, 9 J. EUROPEAN PUB. POL'Y
873, 873-93 (2002); Mark Thatcher, Regulation After Delegation: Independent
Regulatory Agencies in Europe, 9 J. EUROPEAN PUB. POL'Y 954, 954-72 (2002).
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comparison. 190 This comparison will show that: (1) some institutional
guarantees of independence simply do not exist in Brazil; (2) some
guarantees of independence do exist, but were not designed in a way
that guarantees a high degree of insulation from the President; and
(3) some features were appropriately imported from the American
institutional design, but the design is not effective.
A. Appointment Process and Removal Power
One of the most important and influential aspects of the
organizational structure of IRAs relates to directors' 9 ' who are at the
top of the agencies' decision making chain and are normally
responsible for making final decisions on policies and principles that
will be adopted and enforced by the agencies. In particular, lack of
executive removal power is viewed as a central guarantee of
independence.
If there are no restrictions on the dismissal of
directors (i.e. dismissal is at will), it is unlikely that the directors will
make decisions that contradict the entity with removal power. All
American IRAs indicated above have protected directors against
dismissal at will. 192 and Brazilian agencies have also adopted this
19
feature. 3
Although an important guarantee of independence, the lack of
removal power by the President may be ineffective. The President
can still find ways to "convince" commissioners to resign, leaving a
vacancy that will be filled by the President's own nominees. In fact,
the "throwing in the towel" phenomenon seems to recur in the United

190.
It makes little sense to compare the Brazilian IRAs with their equivalents
in the United States for the purposes of this Article given that the conditions under
which these agencies were implemented were completely different. One of the most
striking differences is the fact that IRAs were not implemented in the United States
with the primary purpose of protecting private investment (at least not officially).
Another important difference is that Congress promoted their implementation in the
U.S., whereas in Brazil the executive branch was in charge of the process. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
191.
See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
192.
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXTS, AND CASES 101 (1999).

193.
In Brazil, there are very few constrained situations under which directors
can be dismissed before the end of their terms of office: resignation, judicial conviction,
or conviction in a disciplinary administrative process. Lei No. 9.986, de 18 de Julho de
2000, D.O.U. de 19.7.2000. (Brazil). This statute was enacted in 2000. From 1997
(when it was implemented) to 2000, the President could remove ANEEL's directors at
will in the first four months of their terms of office. Lei no. 9.427, de 26 de Dezembro
de 1996, art. 8, D.O.U. de 27 de Dezembro de 1996. (Brazil). (This article was revoked
by Lei No. 9.986, art. 5, de 18 de Julho de 2000, D.O.U. de 17.7.2000. (Brazil)).
Because of this design, ANEEL's directors were less protected than ANATEL's. Since
2000, this general law regulates removal power of the President in many agencies,
including ANEEL and ANATEL. Lei No. 9.986, art. 5, de 18 de Julho de 2000, D.O.U.
de 17.7.2000. (Brazil).

20081

INDEPENDENT REGULA TORYAGENCIES A TALE FROM BRAZIL

471

States. 194 Also, in some cases the President may be able to convince
appointees from previous government to adopt his political
preferences. Research on the political context in the United States
reveals political drift might occur when there is an electoral defeat
and a new political coalition assumes the government. 195 However,
this risk has been significantly reduced in the United States since
196
1946, when the Administrative Procedure Act was implemented.
The Act minimizes the risk of political drift by reducing
administrative discretion, increasing transaction costs to change
policies, and granting courts power to interpret agency statutes,
which limits the ability of new appointees to announce new
197
interpretation of statutes.
These two phenomena ("throwing in the tower' and "political
drift") became concrete risks in Brazil when Lula was elected
President. Lula's predecessor, President Cardoso, set up regulatory
agencies in Brazil and nominated all the directors. Thus, when Lula

194.
See Charles T. Goodsell & Ceferina C. Gayo, Appointive Control of Federal
Regulatory Commissions, 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 291, 300-02 (1971) (discussing resignation
behavior); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by
the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980) (analyzing presidential control over
agency rulemaking, particularly through ex parte communications); David Nixon &
Thomas Grayson, Chairmen and the Independence of Independent Regulatory
Commissions 10-11 (Ga. State Univ. American Politics Working Paper Series, 2004)
(on file with author) (showing that the resignations of chairmen became more frequent
after the 1950s reforms, when the President acquired the power to remove
commissioners from their chairmanships). But see Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts
in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 350 (1981) (discussing factors that deter
active supervision and removal of independent agency commissioners).
195.
Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and PresidentialAdministration,26
AM. J. POL. SCI. 197 (1982); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of
Political-BureaucraticAdaptation, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 497 (1993). But see Dan Wood,
Principals,Bureaucrats,and Responsiveness in ClearAir Enforcements, 82 AM. J. POL.
SCi. 213 (1988) (analyzing the case of the Environmental Protection Agency during the
Reagan Administration in order to show that the influence of elected institutions is
limited when an agency has substantial bureaucratic resources and a zeal for their
use).
196.
See generally Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast, The
Political Origins of the Administrative ProcedureAct, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999)
(noting that the Administrative Procedure Act helped overcome New Deal Democrats'
desire to "hard wire" the policies of the New Deal against an expected Republican, antiNew Deal political tide in the late 1940s).
197.
See id. (discussing, in detail, the impact of the Administrative Procedure
Act). Since 1984, however, the standard of judicial reference to agencies' interpretation
of statutes was defined by the two step test set up by the Supreme Court, which states:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
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began his administration, directors from the opposition party headed
all the agencies. In this context, two phenomena seem to have
occurred. First, there were resignations of IRA directors at the
beginning of Lula's mandate.1 98 Second, at least one of the directors
nominated by the previous President (Cardoso) was re-appointed by
the new President (Lula).199
These episodes suggest that there are reasons to doubt whether
the lack of removal power in Brazil is an effective guarantee of
independence. By adopting U.S.-style terms of office for directors,
with lack of removal power by the President, Brazil seems to have
similarly imported the problems of effectiveness that were linked to
this guarantee in the United States.
B. Chairmen
One of the directors of an independent regulatory agency is
typically appointed to serve as the agency's chairman. 20 0 Depending
on the powers conferred on the chairman, he can be significantly
more influential within the agency than any other director. When the
President chooses the chairman, the powers conferred on the
chairman largely define the indirect influence the President can have
2 01
over the agency.
In the United States, the design of independent regulatory

agencies underwent major reforms in the

1950s.

20 2

Since then, the

chairman's power increased significantly. It now includes, for
instance, the power to select and supervise personnel, to distribute
workload among these personnel, and to determine the use and
expenditure of funds. 20 3 In addition, the 1950 reforms also instituted
the presidential appointment of the chairman, after which the
President began to have more influence over independent agencies. 20 4
Brazil has followed the post-1950s model of the United States in
two aspects: chairmen have significant powers within the agency and

198.
See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
199.
See infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
200.
In Portuguese, Diretor Geral or Diretor-Presidente.
201.
The President can influence the agency through the chairman in a number
of different ways. The chairman can, for instance, influence the decision-making
process within the commission if he has the institutional authority to set the agenda
for discussions and to assign the majority opinion. In addition, he could have influence
over the other directors if he has privileged access over the staff and controls the
budget of the agency. Nixon & Grayson, supra note 194.
202.
The reforms were based on the recommendations in a report by the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. COMM'N ON
ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T,
COMMISSIONS: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (Mar. 1949).

203.
204.

Nixon & Grayson, supra note 194.
Id.

INDEPENDENT

REGULATORY
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are appointed by the President from the ranks of directors. 20 5 The
most significant difference is that, in some U.S. agencies, the
chairman serves at the President's will and can be dismissed from the
position (of chairman) at any time. 206 In contrast, in Brazil, the
chairman has a fixed term of office and thus cannot be dismissed at
will. 20 7 The consequence is that in the United States, a President can
appoint a new chairman at the beginning of his Presidential
mandate, while in Brazil this is not allowed.
Despite being more protective than the U.S. system, the
Brazilian approach still leaves some room open for Presidential
influence. For ANATEL and other agencies, the position of chairman
has a fixed term of office, but the length of this term is left to
presidential discretion (without being longer than the period in which
the chairman will be serving as director). 20 8 Under this system, the
President can use the length of the term of office as a system of
incentives to influence chairmen, creating short terms of office during
his presidential mandate so that the chairman is likely to act in
accordance with the President's preferences. The President can also
grant longer terms of office for chairmen at the end of the presidential
mandate to ensure that they will remain in their positions even if he
loses the next presidential election. President Lula seems to have
used the first strategy of short term appointments at the beginning of
his administration. 20 9 What remains to be seen is whether Lula will

205.
For the appointment generally, see Lei No. 9.986, art. 5, pardgrafo dnico de
18 de Julho de 2000, D.O.U. de 17.7.2000. (Brazil). For the powers within the agency,
see for instance, Lei No. 9.472, art. 32, de 16 de Julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997
(Brazil).
206.
Nixon & Grayson, supra note 194.
207.
Lei No. 9.986, art. 5, de 18 de Julho de 2000, D.O.U. de 17.7.2000 (Brazil).
208.
There have been two systems of fixed terms of office for chairmen in Brazil.
Before 2000, most of the Brazilian agencies had a fixed term of office for chairman
defined by a statutory provision. At ANATEL, for instance, the chairman would have a
three-year term of office as chairman (while as director the term of office is five years).
Lei No. 9.472, art. 31, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997. (Brazil). In 2000,
the Brazillian Congress enacted a general statute to regulate the internal structure of
all regulatory agencies, establishing a new system of fixed terms of office for chairmen.
209.
In ANATEL, for instance, Lula appointed his first chairman for a one-year
term starting in January 2004. Following the same pattern, the chairman of the
national waters agency (ANA) was appointed in January 2005 for a one-year term of
office. See Decretos de 6 de Janeiro de 2004, D.O.U. de 6.1.2004. (Brazil) (appointing
Pedro Jaime Ziller de Aradjo to ANATEL in 2004). In ANA, Jos6 Machado was
appointed chairman of the ANA. Assessoria de Comunicavdo-ANA, Plendrio do
Senado Aprova Kelman para ANEEL e Machado para a ANA [Plenary of the Senate
Approves Kelman to ANEEL and Machado for the ANA], Dec. 22, 2004, available at
http://www.ana.gov.brlDestaque/destaque229.asp.
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extend the length of the terms of office for chairmen at the end of the
210
presidential mandate.
The only exception to this new system is the electricity agency.
While all other statutes governing the agencies state that the
chairman will be chosen among one of the existing directors,
ANEEL's statute creates a special position called chairman-director
(diretor-geral).211 Therefore, within ANEEL, one of the appointments
is pre-defined as a chairman, and the director who occupies that
position will perform the functions of chairman during his whole term
212
of office.
Although ANEEL's fixed terms of office can be considered a
higher guarantee of independence for the chairman than the flexible
terms of office at the other IRAs, this guarantee generally seems to be
ineffective in Brazil. 213 The main reason for this inefficacy is that the
fixed terms are compromised by the two problems described above:
"throwing in the towel" and "political drift." The former seems to
have occurred in the case of ANATEL's chairman, Luiz Guilherme
Schymura. 214 Two other resignations during Lula's government

210.
This incentive exists in Brazil because the chairman cannot be removed by
the new President. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. On July 7, 2006, Lula
appointed Plinio de Aguiar as temporary chairman of ANATEL, granting him a
mandate until December 31, 2006 or until a permanent chairman was appointed. At
the time of the appointment, Lula was in the last year of his presidential mandate and
was running for re-election. If Lula was defeated, he would be able to nominate a
permanent chairman before leaving the Presidency, and this new chairman could not
be removed by the new President. But in November 2006, Lula was re-elected. The
electoral outcome eliminated his incentives to rush with the nomination and to grant a
long term office to the new chairman. Thus, it will be interesting to see how long the
mandate of the chairman will be if Lula is defeated in the next Presidential election in
2010.
211.
Lei No. 9.427, art. 5, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996.
(Brazil).
212.
Id.
Complying with this provision, on January 2005, President Lula
appointed Jerson Kelman to be chairman of the electricity agency for four years.
Minist6rio de Minas e Energia, Decreto de 12 de Janeiro de 2005 (Jan. 12, 2005),
availableat http://www.aneel.gov.br/arquivos/PDF/decreto.pdf.
213.
See infra Part V.A
214.
Shymura confronted the Minister of Telecommunications in Lula's
government in June and December 2003. Guilherme Barros & Humberto Medina,
Atrito Comeqou No ano Passado [Conflict Started Last Year], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO,
Jan. 7, 2004, at B8. In June 2003, there were divergences about the rates increases.
Id. In December 2003, the disagreement was related to the sale of one of the biggest
telecommunications companies in Brazil, Embratel. Guilherme Barros & Fdtima
Fernandes, Ofertas pela Embratel dividem o governo [Bids for Embratel Divide the
Government], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Jan. 14, 2004, at Al. In January 2004, President
Lula called the chairman for a meeting and asked him to resign from the
chairmanship. In response to the presidential request, Schymura said that he was
resigning from both the chairmanship and the commission. Humberto Medina &
Julianna Sofia, Schymura Diz que Lula Pediu Sua Saida em Dezembro [Schymura
Reveals That Lula Asked Him To Leave the Agency in December], FOLHA DE SAO
PAULO, Jan. 8, 2004, at B3; Lula Decide Substituir o Presidente da Anatel [Lula
Decides to Replace Anatel President], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Jan. 7, 2004, at Al.
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deserve a more detailed investigation and could also be evidence of
215
this phenomenon.
"Political drift" might have occurred in the cases of ANEEL and
the Ag~ncia Nacional de Aguas (ANA), in which Lula considered
appointees from the previous administration as possible candidates
for positions. First, Jos6 Mario Abdo, former chairman of ANEEL
and initially appointed by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
was a potential Lula appointee for the oil and gas agency's (Ag~ncia
Nacional de Petr6leo or ANP) chairmanship. 216
Second, Lula
appointed Jerson Kelman, who had previously held important and
sensitive positions in Cardoso's administration, including chairman of
2 18
ANA, 217 as the new chairman of ANEEL.
Why might cooperation with Lula's administration be a plausible
explanation for these episodes, in particular the nomination of
Kelman as chairman of ANEEL? In Brazil, as in other developing
countries, appointed bureaucrats are encouraged to advance the
particular interests of their appointers as opposed to fostering agency
goals.219 New bureaucratic agencies are constantly evolving as they
are implemented and extinguished from one Presidential mandate to
the other. 220 As a consequence, high-level bureaucrats tend to invest
more in their personal careers than in building the bureaucratic

215.
These are the resignations of the director of ANP and a director of ANTT.
Primeira Leitura, Diretor da ANP Renuncia e abre Caminho para que Lula Tenha
Controle da Ag~ncia [Resignation of the ANP Director Opens Room for Presidential
Control Over Agency], EDIQAO, Jan. 15, 2004; Humberto Medina, Governo Ird Obter
Maioria em Ag~ncias em Fevereiro [Government Will Have Appointed the Majority of
Comissioners by February] , FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Jan. 11, 2004, at B3.
216.
Patricia Zimmerman, Diretor da Aneel Quer Acelerar Projetos [Director of
Aneel Wants to Speed Up Projects], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Jan. 1 2005, at B4.
217.
Before becoming chairman of ANA, Jerson Kelman was a member of the
Chamber to Manage the Electricity Crisis in 2001 and President of a Commission in
charge of investigating the reasons of the electricity rationing. Interview with Edvaldo
Alves de Santana, supra note 177. This was one of the most relevant crises during
Cardoso's administration and Kelman perfomed very sensitive functions in these
positions. Thus, it is worth noting that Kelman was regarded as a highly trusted and
extremely competent professional by Cardoso. In fact, he is considered one of the most
important Brazilian experts on hydroelectric systems. Id.
218.
Kelman, Acima de Simpatias Politicas [Kelman, Beyond Political Disputes],
0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, Jan. 5, 2005, available at http://www.ana.gov.br/Destaque/
destaque235.asp.
219.
See BARBARA GEDDES, THE POLITICIAN'S DILEMMA: BUILDING STATE
CAPACITY IN LATIN AMERICA 56 (1994) (noting that in developing countries, legislators
customarily used bureaucracy appointments as a way to reward those who "formed the
cogs and wheels of their political machines" and will do what is best for the legislators'
constituents).
220.
GEDDES, supra note 219, at 48; BEN Ross SCHNEIDER, POLITICS WITHIN THE
STATE: ELITE BUREAUCRATS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL (Univ.
of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).
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agencies in which they are working.2 2 1 By building a network of
political contacts based on loyalty and exchanges of personal favors,
these bureaucrats are able to migrate from agency to agency and
secure high-level bureaucratic positions despite the lack of
institutional protection in the bureaucracy. 22 2 All this suggests that
in Brazil, directors might be more inclined to favor political parties in
their decisions and to protect their networks of personal contacts,
which creates a considerable space for partisan interests within the
223
IRAs.
This hypothesis of political drift, however, is not conclusive. A
second possible explanation is that President Lula decided to
nominate well-known experts in these areas, as opposed to political
appointees. His nominees, in this regard, coincided with those chosen
by Cardoso, who was known for his "technical" (as opposed to
"political") appointments to the regulatory agencies. 22 4 Nominating
well-known experts could be Lula's strategy to gain senatorial
approval of his nominations since, unlike Cardoso, his coalition did
22 5
not have a majority in the Senate.
This second explanation, however, does not tell us how these
"technical" appointees would behave in circumstances in which there
was room for political decisions.
Would they side with the
preferences of the President who appointed them? The case of
Schymura seems to indicate that if they did not, they could be
pressured to leave the agency. 226 Also, the Brazilian bureaucracy's
structure described above indicates that they would have strong
incentives to side with the current President. Thus, even if the
"technical" nature of the appointment is what prevailed in Lula's
decision, it seems realistic to expect some drift from these
227
appointees.

221.
GEDDES, supra note 219, at 48.
222.
Id.
223.
On the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume that IRA directors who
don't have political affiliations and want to continue working for the government have
strong incentives to adjust to presidential preferences, so that they can keep their
appointments throughout different administrations. On the other hand, there are
institutional tools that allow for presidential influence over the agencies. Lula has
been able, for instance, to keep the electricity agency under close control due to
budgetary restrictions-and this might have affected ANEEL's independence during
Jos6 Mario Abdo's chairmanship, as will be discussed in more detail below. It is hard
to determine the relative importance of each of these factors, and which of them, if any,
prevails.
224.
Most of the nominees in Cardoso's administration were not affiliated with
any political party. See infra note 240. In addition, some of these appointees were well
known in academia and in the specialized bureaucracy for their technical expertise.
225.
The Author would like to thank Edvaldo Alves Santana for calling her
attention to this hypothesis.
226.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
227.
A third hypothesis to explain the fact that Lula appointed nominees from
the previous government to the agencies is not political drift on the side of the agencies'
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All these episodes suggest that the lack of removal power for
chairmen, although formally guaranteed, may not be effective.
Despite having fixed terms of office established in the statutes, the
chairmen seem to succumb to political pressure either through
resignation or through political drift. Furthermore, the problem of
political drift can be aggravated in Brazil by the instability of the
bureaucratic structures.
The experience in the United States shows that not involving the
President in the chairmanship appointment process could reduce the
possibility of the President imposing his preferences upon the agency
through its chairmen. Before the 1950s reforms in the United States,
chairmen were selected through internal elections or annual
rotations. 228 Presidential influence over the agencies was much
smaller in this regime. 22 9 The power to appoint and remove the
chairmen increased the President's removal power because demoted
chairmen tend to resign from the commission, and not only from the
chairmanship. 230
These resignations reduce the time that the
President needs to appoint the board's majority, especially if the
agency has a feature called partisan balance,2 3 1 a concept that will be
discussed in more detail below.
Despite not limiting the Presidential power to appoint chairmen,
Brazil has constrained presidential power to appoint directors in a
series of ways. The mechanisms of constraint, their designs, and
their effectiveness will be discussed in more detail below (Parts V.C
and V.D).
C. Approval by the Senate and PartisanBalance
In addition to influencing the chairman, the President may have
a strong influence over agencies through nominations.
The
President's nominees are likely to be oriented towards his political
preferences.
In this regard, the U.S. IRAs' institutional design

directors, but political drift on the side of the President. In other words, one could
consider that Lula's policies were not significantly different from the ones implemented
by the Cardoso Administration. Although this seems to be accurate for most
macroeconomic policies, this was not the case in the telecommunications and electricity
sectors. See discussion supraPart III.
228.
See, e.g., Marc Winerman, The FTC at Ninety: History Through Headlines,
72 ANTITRUST L.J. 871, 873 (2005) (describing the Federal Trade Commission's
procedure for selecting a commissioner prior to 1950 and how this procedure changed
after 1950).
229.
See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 196, at 186 (explaining that
the Administrative Procedure Act's formalized procedures increase the influence of the
legislative and judicial branches at the expense of the executive)
230.
Moe, supra note 195, at 200; Nixon & Grayson, supra note 194, at 12.
231.
Nixon & Grayson, supra note 194, at 11.
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mentioned above has two features that may decrease the chances of
having appointees who are strongly aligned with presidential
23 2
preferences: approval by the Senate and partisan balance.
Requiring senatorial approval of presidential nominees
constrains the President's choices because the Senate has veto power
over his nomination. 233 In order to avoid a veto of one of his
nominees, the President must consider the Senate's preferences.
Following the U.S. design, almost all constitutive statutes in Brazil
234
require this approval.
It is curious to observe, however, that the Senate rarely rejects
nominees. In Brazil, there have only been two vetoes of presidential
nominations by the Senate-for two directors of the oil and gas
agency (ANP) in 2003 and 2005.235
In the case of ANATEL,
senatorial approval of presidential nominations has been almost
unanimous. 23 6 Similarly, in the United States, approvals follow the

232.
David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 438, 439 (2004).
233.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for ....");
Note, CongressionalPower Under the Appointments Clause After Buckley v. Valeo, 75
MICH. L. REV. 627, 637-38 (1977) ("Commentators and case law interpret [the
Appointments Clause] to mean that the Senate possesses a 'veto' power .... ")
(footnotes omitted). The range of legislation that impinges on the presidential power of
appointment includes all of the additional requirements that must be fulfilled by the
potential nominees, such as personal qualifications and backgrounds. Other factors
that may reduce the range of potential candidates are salaries for public servants as
defined by Congress and limitations to post-termination economic activities of the
directors. See Congressional Power Under the Appointments Clause After Buckley v.
Valeo, supra, at 640 (stating that it is "beyond dispute" that the establishment of
qualifications for holding federal office is a prerogative of Congress).
234.
See Lei No. 9.472, art. 23, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997.
(Brazil) (establishing ANATEL); Lei No. 9.427, art. 5, de 26 de dezembro de 1996,
D.O.U. de 27.12.1996. (Brazil) (establishing ANEEL); Lei No. 9.478, art. 11, de 6 de
agosto de 1997, D.O.U. de 7.8.1997. (Brazil) (establishing ANP); Lei No. 9.782, art. 10,
de 26 de janeiro de 1999, D.O.U. de 27.1.1999. (Brazil) (establishing ANVISA); Lei No.
9.961, art. 6, de 28 de janeiro de 2000. (Brazil) (establishing ANS); Lei No. 10.233, art.
53, de 5 de junho de 2001, D.O.U. de 6.6.2001. (Brazil) (establishing ANTAO and
ANTT); Medida Provis6ria No. 2.228-1, art. 8, de 6 de setembro de 2001, D.O.U. de
10.9.2001. (Brazil) (establishing ANCINE). The only exception is ANA. See Lei No.
9.984, de 17 de julho de 2000, D.O.U. de 18.7.2000. (Brazil).
235.
The appointees vetoed were Luiz Alfredo Salomdo and Jos6 Fantine.
Senado rejeita indicado de novo diretor-geral da ANP, UOL, April 12, 2005 (on file
with author); Ricardo Rego Monteiro, Veto a Salomdo Alerta Governo para Reformas
[The Veto of Solomdo Alerts the Government to Reform], JORNAL DO BRASIL, June 26,
2003; Veto Foi Visto com Surpresapor Atual Diretor [Veto Surprises Agency's Director],
FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, June 26, 2003.
236.
See Guerreiro Vai PresidirAnatel por Tr~s Anos [Guerreiro Is the President
of ANATEL for the Next Three Years], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Oct. 23, 1997, at 2-3
(stating that the Brazilian Senate approved the nominee for the telecommunications
agency on October 22, 1997, with fifty-nine votes in favor and two against). Lula's
nominee for the telecommunications agency was approved with fifty-seven votes in
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same pattern. 237 This lack of rejections can be interpreted in two
ways: (1) the President controls nominations and the Senate is
unlikely to oppose appointees, especially on ideological grounds, 238 or
(2) the President is forced to anticipate the Senate's preferences in
23 9
order to avoid vetoes.
It is hard to determine which hypothesis better explains the
Brazilian case. There are at least two facts that could support the
hypothesis that senatorial approvals do not restrain the President's
choices for agency appointments. First, President Lula was able to
obtain senatorial approval of a number of political appointees, many
of whom were members of the President's workers' party. 240 Second,
the two vetoes exercised by Congress were not due to the political
affiliation, policy preferences, or personal qualifications of the
candidates. 241
Instead, the vetoes were ascribed to personal
243
revenge 242 and political retaliation.

favor and five against. IGP-DI Reajustard Telefonia, Afirma Ziller [Tariffs Increases
Will Be Determined by IGP-DI], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Jan. 25, 2004, at B12.
237.
See Timothy P. Nokken & Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics: A Model
of PresidentialAppointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 91, 92
(2000), available at http://jtp.sagepub.comlcgi/content/abstract/12/1/91 (stating that the
few approvals that have recorded votes show an overwhelming approval).
238.
Cf. Terry Moe, Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of
the NLRB, in 2 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 236, 251 (Karen Orren

& Stephen Skowronek eds., 1987) (stating that, for various reasons, "senators of all
ideological stripes are strongly disposed to vote affirmatively on virtually every
presidential nominee" to the National Labor Relations Board).
239.
See Nixon, supra note 232, at 439 (identifying authors who support this
argument).
240.
Three of Lula's appointees were politicians defeated in the 2002 elections.
Miriam Leitdo, Erro Perigoso [A Dangerous Mistake], 0 GLOBO, Jan. 19, 2005. In
2003, Lula appointed Haroldo Lima, a former representative of the Communist Party
in Congress to the oil & gas agency (ANP). Id. Lima was defeated in the 2002 election
for Congress, and eventually became chairman of ANP. Id. In 2005, Jos6 Airton Cirilo,
a member of the worker's party, was appointed director of the ground transportation
agency (ANTT) after being defeated in the elections for governor of the state of Ceara
in 2002. Id. Additionally, in 2005, Jos6 Machado, also a member of the workers' party,
was nominated as director of the waters agency (ANA) after being defeated in the
reelection campaign for mayor of the city of Piracicaba in the state of Sio Paulo. Id.;
Jo~o Domingos, Lula Comea Reforma Pelas Bordas e Partidariza Agencies
Reguladoras [Lula Initiates Piecemeal Reforms and Politicizes Agencies], 0 ESTADO DE
SAO PAULO, Jan. 18, 2005.
241.
See, e.g., Monteiro, supra note 235 (noting that a senator claimed the
disapproval of Salomdo to the ANP was for personal reasons alone); Senado rejeita
indicagdo de novo diretor-geralda ANP, supra note 235.
242.
Monteiro, supra note 235. The nominee had led an investigation of
corruption against one of the parties with a majority in Congress, and the veto (as
articulated by the leader of this party in Congress) was regarded as revenge. Id.
243.
The second veto was seen as retaliation against the Lula Administration for
refusing to give an important position in the state bureaucracy to one of the parties in
the governmental coalition rather than a veto related to the appointee himself. Senado
rejeitaindicagdo de novo diretor-geralda ANP, supranote 235.
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However, there are also reasons to believe that the second
hypothesis (namely, that senatorial preferences have an impact on
the choice of the appointees) may explain the Brazilian case. Lula
does not have the majority in the Senate, and for this reason, his
choices are much more restricted than Cardoso's. 244 In fact, the
Brazilian Senate vetoed two of Lula's nominations, and none of
Cardoso's. 245 In addition, some of Lula's nominations that were
approved by the Senate were previous Cardoso appointees. 246 As
mentioned earlier, Lula may have made these choices in order to
avoid resistance in the Senate.247
If we assume that senatorial approvals do not restrain the
President's choices for agency appointments, implementing this
feature is not a very effective way of guaranteeing the independence
of regulatory agencies. If we consider the contrary hypothesis (that
senatorial approvals do restrain Presidential choices), the question
remains whether the Senate imposes an ideological restraint in
Brazil. The two vetoes that occurred in Brazil suggest that parochial
interests and patronage shaped the restraint. If this is the case,
senatorial approval of nominations can be regarded as a guarantee of
independence that does not function in Brazil in the same way that it
does in the United States. There is, however, no conclusive evidence
that either of these hypotheses is correct.
The second American constraint on presidential nominations is
partisan balance. Some of the American IRAs, such as the FERC, the
FCC, and the FMC, require that no more than three out of the total
This
five commissioners belong to the same political party.248
least
(at
opinions
in
the
agency's
level
of
plurality
constant
a
ensures
two out of five commissioners are not from the President's party),
reducing Presidential influence. 249 Brazil has not adopted such a
feature, so all directors of a Brazilian agency can be affiliated with
the same party.
Exploiting the lack of a partisan balance requirement, President
Cardoso distributed the seats in the IRAs among the parties of his

244.
The Author would like to thank Edvaldo Alves Santana for calling her
attention to this hypothesis.
See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
245.
See supra notes 213-15
246.
247.
See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
See 16 U.S.C.A. § 792 (West 2008) (setting the composition of the FERC); 47
248.
U.S.C.A. § 154(b)(5) (West 2008) (setting the composition of the FCC); 46 C.F.R. §
501.2(b) (2007) (setting the composition of the FMC).
The requirement does not say that three members should be two Democrats
249.
and a Republican, or the other way around. Thus, in theory, a Republican President
could appoint a Democrat and an independent, or two independents. In fact, in 2003,
George W. Bush appointed an independent commissioner to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), Pamela Jones Harbour. However, this was a confirmation of a
nomination previously made by the Democrats in 2002, when they had control over
Congress. Jaret Seiberg, Rules of R.I.P., DAILY DEAL, Nov. 16, 2002.
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political coalition. During the Cardoso administration, two parties
250
nominated respectively all the directors of ANATEL and ANEEL.
This not only reduces these IRAs' independence, but also corrupts the
process of nomination, since the positions serve as bargaining chips
251
for political support and coalition building in Congress.
Implementing a partisan balance requirement in Brazil could
reduce the possibility of exchanging nominations for political support,
thereby increasing the level of agency independence. There is one
important obstacle to this proposal, however. Brazil has a multiparty presidential system. 252 In fact, in February 2005, ten political
parties were represented in the Brazilian Senate. 253 It would not be
as easy to implement a partisan requirement in the Brazilian multiparty system as it would be in a two-party presidential system, such
as the United States. Consequently, U.S. IRAs cannot serve as a
model for a partisan balance requirement in the Brazilian case.
An alternative to implementing a partisan balance requirement
in Brazil would be to delegate the appointments to different groups in
Congress. The appointments would be made by party coalitions.
Agencies could be composed of an equal number of appointees from
the governing coalition and the opposing coalition, with a tie-breaking
chairman appointed by both coalitions. 254 Thus, the Senate leader of

250.
The parties were Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) and
Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL). Cardoso granted four of the five seats in ANATEL to
PSDB and all of the seats in ANEEL to PFL. Raymundo Costa & Asdrdbal Figueir6,
FHC Loteia Agdncias de Infra-Estrutura [FHC delegates the nomination of agencies'
directors to political allies], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Dec. 7, 1997. Although the
nominations came from these parties, the nominees were not necessarily party
members and did not necessarily have any party affiliation with PSDB and PFL.
Interview with Omar Abud, Chief of Staff, ANEEL (2003) (on file with author).
251.
This could explain the high rate of senatorial approval of presidential
nominations. See Nokken & Sala, supra note 237, at 93, 96. However, it is not
completely clear whether Lula had been using this strategy at all in his
administration. As mentioned earlier, Lula nominated mostly politicians affiliated
with his party who lost elections or appointees from Cardoso's administration. This
seems to indicate that Lula is not distributing seats in exchange for the political
support of other parties (at least not in IRAs). Because he did not have a majority in
the Senate, it seems harder for Lula to use these positions as bargaining chips as
Cardoso did. Interview with Edvaldo Alves Santana, Independent Consultant for the
Privatization Process and Current Dir., ANEEL (July 26, 2006) (on file with author).
252.
CONSTITUICAO FEDERAL arts. 45, 76-77 (Braz.).
253.
The parties were the following: Partido Democrdtico Trabalhista (PDT),
Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL), Partido Liberal (PL), Partido do Movimento
Democrdtico Brasileiro (PMDB), Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), Partido Socialista
Brasileiro(PSB), Partido da Social DemocraciaBrasileira(PSDB), PartidoSocialismo
e Liberdade (PSOL), Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), and Partido Trabalhista
Brasileiro (PTB). Senado Federal-Senadores em exercicio, http://www.senado.gov.br/
sf/senadores/senadoresatual.asp?o=2&u=*&p=* (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
254.
This proposal is inspired by the design of legislative redistricting
commissions in the United States. See Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the People's
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the governing coalition (lider do Governo no Congresso) and the
Senate leader of the opposition parties (lider da oposi~do no
Congresso) would each be responsible for half of the appointments.
This alternative option, however, has a downside: it excludes the
President from the appointment process and might generate rivalry
between agencies and ministries, which would, in turn, jeopardize the
executive branch's functioning as a whole. 255 To avoid such an
occurrence, Brazil could instead keep half of its appointments in the
President's hands and give the other half to the leader of the
opposition parties in the Senate. This model has been followed in
other political systems such as in Bulgaria, where the Parliament,
the President, and sometimes the Council of Ministers appoint the
directors of agencies.25 6 Thus, it would not be impossible to create a
partisan balance requirement in Brazil, but it is unclear which
257
particular design best fits the country's needs.
D. The Commission and Its Structure:Design
In addition to senatorial approval and partisan balance, the
American IRAs have other guarantees of independence: a board or
commission of five or seven members heads them and makes collegial
decisions (as opposed to an agency headed by one sole director).
Collegial decisions reduce the possibility of Presidential influence
over agencies because each individual member might be subject to
different incentives. 258 Like the American agencies, most of the IRAs'
rule-making power in Brazil is exercised through collegial decisions,

Business: An Examination of the Utility of Nonpolitical! Bipartisan Legislative
RedistrictingCommissions, 13 KA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 115, 119-20 (2003-2004).
255.
Nick Manning & Yasuhiko Matsuda, Difficulties with Autonomous
Agencies, July 27, 2000, http://web.worldbank.org/ (search "All" for "Difficulties with
Autonomous Agencies"; then follow the first hyperlink in the results of the search).
This is the case of the Council of Electronic Media and the Communications
256.
Regulation Commission. The former has a board of nine commissioners, five of whom
are elected by the parliament and four of whom are appointed by the President. The
latter has five commissioners; one (the chairman) is appointed and dismissed by
decision of the Council of Ministers, another three (the vice-chairman and two others)
are elected and dismissed by the Parliament, and one member is appointed and
dismissed by the President. OECD, REGULATORY POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES: FROM
INTERVENTIONISM TO REGULATORY GOVERNANCE, supra note 12, at 49.
257.
It is beyond the scope of this article to develop a concrete proposal, which
would necessarily involve a complex normative analysis of the optimal level of
independence of the Brazilian IRAs. The latter remains a largely unexplored topic
both in Brazil and in most of the literature on IRAs.
258.
See Paul L. Joskow, Regulatory Priorities for Reforming Infrastructure
Sectors in Developing Countries, at 30-31 (paper prepared for the Annual World Bank
Conference on Dev,. Econ., Wash., D.C., Apr. 20-21, 1998), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON1998/Resources/joskow.p
df (' There is necessarily a tradeoff between the ability of a single regulator to make
reasonably quick decisions and the potential that the single regulator will abuse the
authority that he or she has been given.").
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in which each director has an equal vote and a majority vote
259
determines the final outcome.
The basic assumption to implement a collegial decision-making
process is that it is easier for the President to influence an agency
headed by one sole director than an agency headed by a
commission. 2 60 Going one step further, the number of directors in a
commission with a collegial structure is another important
institutional guarantee of independence. When there are fewer
directors, the President needs fewer nominations to constitute the
board of directors' majority. Unlike the United States, however,
Brazilian IRAs have between three and five directors. 261 Both
ANATEL and ANEEL, which will be discussed in more detail below,
have five directors. 262 Five directors assure more independence than
three or four, but less than seven. Thus, ANATEL and ANEEL are
less independent than the American IRAs with seven commissioners.
Agency independence is affected not only by the existence of a
commission that makes collegial decisions and the number of
directors, but also by the structure of this commission. In light of
this, three aspects seem to be particularly relevant: length of the
directors' terms of office, existence of staggered terms, and the
interval between each nomination. With respect to these three
aspects, the Brazilian IRAs are not only distinct from their American
counterparts, but they also differ among themselves.

259.
Lei No. 9.472, art. 20, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997. (Brazil)
(establishing ANATEL); Lei No. 9.427, art. 4, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de
27.12.1996. (Brazil) (establishing ANEEL); Lei No. 9.478, art. 11, de 6 de agosto de
1997, D.O.U. de 7.8.1997. (Brazil) (establishing ANP); Lei No. 9.961, art. 6, de 28 de
janeiro de 2000, D.O.U. de 29.1.2000. (Brazil) (establishing ANS); Lei No. 9.782, art. 9,
de 26 de janeiro de 1999, D.O.U. de 27.1.1999. (Brazil) (establishing ANVISA); Lei No.
10.233, arts. 52, 67, de 5 de junho de 2001, D.O.U. de 6.6.2001. (Brazil) (establishing
ANTAQ and ANTT respectively); Lei No. 9.984, arts. 9, 12, de 17 de julho de 2000,
D.O.U. de 18.7.2000. (Brazil) (establishing ANA); Medida Provis6ria No. 2.228-1, art. 8,
de 6 de setembro de 2001, D.O.U. de 10.9.2001. (Brazil) (establishing ANCINE).
260.
But there are other risks. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) (commenting on the impact of group
polarization); Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.,
John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 91, 1999) (analyzing the group
polarization phenomenon); see also Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle
Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A PreliminaryInvestigation,
90 VA. L. REV. 301, 314 (2004) (showing how Republican appointees show far more
conservative voting patterns when sitting with two other Republican appointees and
that Democratic appointees show far more liberal voting patterns when sitting with
two other Democratic appointees).
261.
See, e.g., Lei No. 9.427, art. 29, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de
27.12.1996. (Brazil) (ANEEL has five directors); Lei No. 9.961, art. 10, de 28 de janeiro
de 2000, D.O.U. de 29.1.2000. (Brazil) (ANS has three directors).
262.
Lei No. 9.427, art. 29, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996.
(Brazil) (ANEEL); Lei No. 9.472, art. 20, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997.
(Brazil) (ANATEL).
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The longer the directors' terms of office, the more independence
that will be guaranteed. The term of office in the United States
varies from five to nine years, while in Brazil it ranges from three to
five. 263 In fact, the majority of Brazilian IRAs have terms of four
years. 264 ANATEL (the telecommunications agency) is the only
agency that differs, having a five-year term of office. 2 65 Thus,
ANATEL not only has the longest terms of office among Brazilian
IRAs, but the directors' terms of office are longer than the
President's. Similar to the United States, the presidents of Brazil
have a four-year term of office with the possibility of being re-elected
for one additional term. 266 As a result, at least one ANATEL director
is in office longer than the presidential mandate. This term structure
is one safeguard against the total domination of the agency by the
nominees of a single President. 267 Consequently, the four-year term
of most Brazilian agencies is less effective than the five-year term
adopted by ANATEL.
In addition to the length of the term, another important feature
is the interval between nominations. Nominations may coincide or be
staggered. Staggered nominations mean that within one agency the
terms of office of directors will not overlap. A system of staggered
terms guarantees a higher degree of independence if it reduces or
eliminates altogether overlapping nominations. For this purpose,

263.
See, e.g., About the FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2008) (stating that Commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission
serve five-year terms); see infra note 265 and accompanying text.
264.
Two of the nine federal IRAs implemented in the Brazilian system have
three-year mandates for directors (ANS and ANVISA). Lei No. 9.961, art. 6, de 28 de
janeiro de 2000, D.O.U. de 29.1.2000. (Brazil) (ANS); Lei No. 9.782, art. 10, de 26 de
janeiro de 1999, D.O.U. de 27.1.1999. (Brazil) (ANVISA). One has a five-year mandate
for the directors (ANATEL). Lei No. 9.472, art. 24, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de
17.7.1997. (Brazil). The remaining six have four-year mandates (ANEEL, ANP, ANA,
ANTAQ, ANTT, and ANCINE). Lei No. 9.427, art. 29, de 26 de dezembro de 1996,
D.O.U. de 27.12.1996. (Brazil) (ANEEL); Lei No. 9.478, art. 11, de 6 de agosto de 1997,
D.O.U. de 7.8.1997. (Brazil) (ANP); Lei No. 10.233, art. 54, de 5 de junho de 2001,
D.O.U. de 6.6.2001. (Brazil) (ANTAQ and ANTT); Lei No. 9.984, art. 9, de 17 de julho
de 2000, D.O.U. de 18.7.2000. (Brazil) (ANA); Medida Provis6ria No. 2.228.1, art. 8, de
6 de setembro de 2001, D.O.U. de 10.9.2001. (Brazil) (ANCINE).
265.
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
266.
Constitutional Amendment 16/97 implemented the change. CONSTITUICkO
FEDERAL amend. 16 (Braz.). The original provision of the 1988 Constitution modified
by the Amendment established that the presidential term was five years with no
reelection. See id. art. 82, amended by amend. 16.
267.
A very convincing outlier (a person who is not like-minded) might be able to
shift the other commissioners away from their original tendencies. See Sunstein, The
Law of Group Polarization, supra note 260, at 180. To be sure, there is also the
contrary risk. Studies about judicial voting on federal courts of appeals have
demonstrated that the majority pressures can be powerful. See Sunstein, Schkade &
Ellman, supra note 260, at 305-10 (demonstrating, among other phenomena, that
Democratic appointees in the judiciary produce quite conservative voting patterns
when sitting with two Republican appointees, and that when sitting with two
Democratic appointees, Republican appointees are fairly liberal).
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intervals should distribute the nominations along the period of the
presidential mandate in such a way that the beginning of one
director's term will not coincide with the beginning of another
directors'; as a consequence, the end of their respective terms will not
overlap. These intervals will also define the distribution of
nominations within the presidential term of office.
This is especially important in agencies without a partisan
balance requirement, such as those in Brazil, because if all directors
are nominated by the President at the beginning of the presidential
mandate, it is more likely that the agency will follow the presidential
orientation than if it were composed of appointees of the opposing
political coalition or previous administrations. Thus, a system of
staggered terms for directors addresses this concern, allowing for a
pluralistic composition. Within this system, the President has to
negotiate with an agency that is headed (at least partially) by
nominees of previous administrations.
The American agencies have adopted a staggered system in
which there is one nomination per year if all commissioners serve
their full terms. 268 Agencies such as the NLRB and SEC, for
instance, have no overlapping nominations, and every year there
should be a new presidential appointment. 269
Similar to the
270
American agencies, the Brazilian IRAs have staggered terms.
However, eight of the nine agencies have at least one overlapping
nomination, i.e. the beginning of one director's term will coincide with
the beginning of another director. The only exception is ANATEL.
In ANATEL, the President nominates one director per year, so
that each President can nominate four ANATEL directors during his
mandate (as noted above, ANATEL has a commission with five
directors and each director has a five-year term of office). 271 If all
directors complete their terms of office regularly, the government will
never be able to have five appointments at ANATEL.2 72 Thus, among
the systems implemented in Brazil, ANATEL's seems to be the best
method of staggering nominations: one nomination per year and no
overlapping nominations.
In contrast with ANATEL, ANEEL has the highest number of
overlapping nominations in Brazil.
Out of five directors (each

268.
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(a) (West 2008)
(establishing that the Securities and Exchange Commission shall consist of five
members who serve five-year terms); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §
153(a) (West 2008) (establishing that the National Labor Relations Board shall consist
of five members who serve five-year terms).
269.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(a); 29 U.S.C.A. § 153(a).
270.
See, e.g., Lei No. 9.472, art. 24, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997.
(Brazil) (staggering the tenure of the five commissioners of ANATEL).
271.
See supra notes 262, 265-67 and accompanying text.
272.
The possibility of re-nomination is not being considered.
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appointed for a period of four years), three are nominated in the first
year of the presidential mandate, and the other two in the following
year. 273 Therefore, by the second year of the presidential mandate,
the agency's directors will all be the President's nominees. As a
result, ANEEL's system of staggered appointments does not provide a
274
secure guarantee of independence.
The conclusion here is that the interval between nominations
should be spread out as evenly as possible, with the nominations
coinciding as little as possible. For agencies with five directors in a
system with four-year presidential mandates, the five-year term of
office for directors seems to be a stronger guarantee of independence
for agencies than other terms implemented in Brazil.
Even the five-year mandates with modulated staggered terms,
however, have an important weakness. In the case of the Brazilian
agencies, a President's reelection would make all agencies equally
vulnerable to presidential influence. As of the first year of the second
presidential mandate, the President would have only his appointees
in the agency. Therefore, if we consider the possibility of reelection,
even the ANATEL system (five-year mandate for agency directors
with modulated staggered terms) is not ideal. In addition, even if reelection does occur, independence will be impaired if a candidate of
the same party is elected. 275 Thus, without partisan balance, the
length of the directors' mandates might not be an effective guarantee
of independence, even with a five-year mandate.
E. The Commission and Its Structure:Effectiveness
The previous Parts have discussed how the system of staggered
terms adopted in Brazil might affect the level of independence of
IRAs. However, the system defined by the statutes was not fully
implemented in Brazil. Take, for instance, the staggered system of
nominations guaranteeing a higher level of independence that was
adopted by the Brazillian telecommunications agency ANATEL.
ANATEL is supposed to have five directors, each serving a five-year
term of office with no coinciding nominations (one appointment per

273.
Lei No. 9.427, arts. 5, 29, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996.
(Brazil).
274.
ANEEL's system of staggered nominations could be designed to have one
nomination per year. In the Brazilian system, some agencies with four-year terms
have implemented this system. When they have five directors, like ANEEL, these
systems will necessarily have one year with two coinciding nominations. This is the
case of ANP and ANTI. In these cases, it is important to note that the later in the
presidential term this coinciding appointment occurs, the less the agency's
independence will be affected.
275.
It is reasonable to assume that the directors appointed by the same party
will be more cooperative with the newly elected candidate than they would be with a
newly elected candidate of the opposition party.
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year). 276 This organizational structure was created by statute, but
because of many delays in the nominations, the system implemented
2 77
is different from the statutory one.
The discrepancy occurred because, in Brazil, terms run with the
director instead of being fixed in time.278 To create staggered terms,
the agencies' constitutive statutes established different terms of office
for the first five directors. 279 In the case of ANATEL, the terms of
office for the first nominations of five directors would be three, four,
five, six and seven years, respectively. 28 0 In this system, if one
nomination is delayed, there are two consequences.
First, the
intervals between the end of the term of office of one director and the
nomination of his successor create a less staggered system than the
one designed in the constitutive statute, which sometimes generates
coinciding nominations. Second, the successor's nomination will be
also delayed in a domino effect.
The first coinciding nominations occurred in ANATEL in 2002,281
when the 2001 nomination was delayed. In November 2001, a

276.
See supranote 262, 265 and accompanying text.
277.
For details on the delays, see infra notes 279-96 and accompanying text
278.
See, e.g., Lei No. 9.472, arts. 24-25, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de
17.7.1997. (Brazil) (stating that the Directors of ANATEL shall serve five-year terms
and the terms of the first five directors shall be three, four, five, six, and seven years,
respectively); Lei No. 9.427, art. 5, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996.
(Brazil) (stating that the Directors of ANEEL are appointed for four-year nonconcurrent terms).
279.
See, e.g., Lei No. 9.472, art. 25, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997.
(Brazil) (enumerating terms of three, four, five, six, and seven years for the first five
directors of ANATEL).
280.
Id. In 1997, five directors were nominated for ANATEL: Renato Guerreiro
was nominated as head of the agency for a three-year term (ending in 2000); Luis
Francisco Ten6rio Perrone was nominated for a four-year term (ending in 2001); Jos6
Leite Pereira Filho was nominated for a five-year term (ending in 2002); MArio Leonel
Neto was nominated for a six-year term (ending in 2003); and Ant6nio Carlos Valente
da Silva was nominated for a seven-year term (ending in 2004). Under the same
Cardoso Administration, some directors were re-nominated and others were replaced.
In 1999, Luis Tito Cerasoli (whose term of office ended in November 2003) was
nominated to replace Mdrio Leonel Neto. Renato Guerreiro was re-nominated in 2000
for a regular five-year term (ending in 2005). See generally Quadro: Quem e Quem na
Anatel [Who Is Who at Anatel], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Oct. 22, 1997, at 2-6; Guerreiro
Vai PresidirANATEL [Guerreiro Will Be the Chairman of ANATEL], FOLHA DE SAO
PAULO, Oct. 8, 1997, at 2-5.
281.
In that year, JosA Leite Pereira Filho was re-nominated for a five-year term
and Luiz Alberto da Silva was nominated for a five-year term (replacing Luis Francisco
Ten6rio Perrone). Press Release, ANATEL, Presidente da Reptiblica Encaminha ao
Senado Nome de Luiz Schymura Para Conselho Director da Anatel [President Submits
the Nomination of Luiz Schymura to Senatorial Approval] (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.anatel.gov.br; Press Release, ANATEL, Senado Aprova Nome de Jos6 Leite
Para Reconduqdo ao Conselho Director da Anatel [Senate approves Jos6 Leite's
renomination to ANATEL] (Sept. 4, 2002), available at http://www.anatel.gov.br/
Portaldocumentos/bibliotecareleases/2002/ release_04_09_2002(2).pdf.
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director left ANATEL at the end of his mandate, but his successor
was nominated only in April 2002.282 Due to the delays in the 2001
nomination, the prospective nominations in January 2003 (the very
beginning of the new presidential mandate after the end of the
Cardoso Administration) were as follows: with respect to the
telecommunications agency, Lula, the current Brazilian President,
could nominate one director in his first year of government (2003),
one director in his second year (2004), and the agency's chairman in
his third year of government (2005). Contrary to the statutes, no
nominations are expected in his last year of government (2006), due
to the delay in the 2001 nomination. Lula's successor would then
have two nominations in the first year of his presidential mandate.
To be sure, the nominations in Lula's government did not follow
this pattern because there were two resignations in 2004.283
Consequently, Lula appointed the majority of directors in the
Brazilian telecommunications agency in November 2004, before the
end of his second year in office. 28 4 However, if the resignations had
not occurred, the delays in Cardoso's nominations would have
reduced the number of nominations for Lula from four to three.
But ANATEL was not the only "victim" of this flawed
implementation of the staggered system of nominations. In the case
of ANEEL, irregular nominations also took place. In 1997, Cardoso
nominated five directors for the electricity agency. 28 5 According to
the statute, there should be three directors nominated for a threeyear term of office and another two directors nominated for a fouryear term of office. 28 6 The first three nominations' mandates came to

282.
The director who left was Perrone, and the new director was Luiz Alberto
da Silva. Press Release, ANATEL, Presidente da Repdiblica Encaminha ao Senado
Nome de Luiz Schymura Para Conselho Director da Anatel, supra note 281. Although
not relevant for this analysis, it is worth noting that a third nomination also occurred
in 2002 due to a resignation. Luiz Guilherme Schymura de Oliveira was nominated to
complete the term of the previous head, Renato Guerreiro, who resigned in March
2002. De surpresa, Guerreiro Demite-se da Anatel [Unexpectedly, Guerreiro Resigns],
FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Mar. 29, 2002, at B8.

283.
The Chairman of ANATEL resigned in January 2004 and a director whose
term of office would end in November resigned in June (Antonio Carlos Valente). VicePresidente da Anatel Deixa o Cargo [Vice-President of Anatel Resigns], FOLHA DE SAO
PAULO, June 5, 2004.
284.
The nominations for these two resignations occurred in July 2004. They
were inaugurated in November 2004. Anatel Recebe Duas Novas Indica¢Ses [Two
Nominations for Anatel], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, July 1, 2004.
285.
FHC Define Nomes da Aneel [FHC Nominates ANEEL's Directors], FOLHA
DE SA

PAULO, Nov. 28, 1997, at 1-12.

286.
Lei No. 9.427, arts. 5, 29, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996.
(Brazil). The directors with three-year terms were Jos6 Mario Miranda Abdo, Afonso
Henriques Moreira Santos, and Eduardo Henrique Ellery Filho. The other two,
Jaconias de Aguiar and Luciano Pacheco Santos, were nominated for four-year terms.
Anatel Recebe Duas Novas Indicaqdes, supra note 284.
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an end in December 2000,287 and the chairman of ANEEL was then

re-nominated for a four-year period (until December 2004).288 The
mandates of the other two directors also ended. 289 While a new
director replaced one, the other was re-nominated. 290
The
substitution and the re-nomination, however, occurred only in May
2001.291 In both cases, there was a four-month interval between the
292
end of the mandates and the re-nomination and replacement.
Similar to the case of ANATEL, these delays in the nominations
increased the number of overlapping nominations (there were four
nominations in 2001, instead of two) and they also had an impact on
the number of nominations to which Cardoso's successor would be
entitled. According to the constitutive statute, Lula should have
nominated three directors in 2004 and two in 2005.293 However, due
to the delays, at the end of 2004 Lula had replaced only the
chairman. 294 The other two nominations would occur four months
later, in May 2005.295
The constitutive statutes of ANATEL and ANEEL (and the other
agencies as well) state only the term of the office's duration, without
defining the precise date on which it ends, thus allowing the delays in

287.
The term of office of the other two ended one year after in December 2001.
Sonia Carneiro & Gilson Euz~bio, Abdo na Frigideira [Abdo in the Frying Pan],
JORNAL DO BRASIL, May 17, 2001; Aneel: FHC Nomeia Ellery e Pedrosacomo Diretores
[FHC Nominates Ellery and Pedrosa as Directors], ENERGY NEWS (Federal School of
Itajubi (EFEI), Itajubi, Braz.), Apr. 2001 [hereinafter EFEI Newsletter].
288.
Aneel e ANP Vdo Manter Titulares [Aneel and ANP Will Keep Their
Directions], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Oct. 21, 2000, at B2.
289.
The directors were Afonso Henriques Moreira Santos and Eduardo
Henrique Ellery Filho. EFEI Newsletter, supra note 287.
290.
Afonso Santos was replaced by Paulo Jerbnimo Bandeira de Mello Pedrosa,
and Eduardo Henrique Ellery Filho was re-appointed for a new four-year term of office.
FHC Define Nomes da Aneel, supra note 285; Senado Aprova Novos Nomes para a
Diretoria da ANEEL [Senate Approves New Names for ANEEL], BOLETIM ENERGIA,
No. 8 (Dec. 13-19, 2001), available at http://www.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoesboletimenergia/documentos/newsletter-ANEEL08.htm.
291.
Indicados para Diretoria da Aneel sdo Sabatinados [Congressional
Hearings for Those Nominated for Aneel], 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, May 2, 2001; EFEI
Newsletter, supra note 287; Paulo Pedrosa Serd Indicado a uma das Diretorias da
Aneel [Pedrosa Will Be Nominated as Director of Aneel], ENERGY NEWS (Federal School
of Itajubd (EFEI), ItajubA, Braz.), Apr. 2001.
292.
Due to these delays in nominations, from January to April 2001, ANEEL
operated with only three directors. Indicadospara Diretoriada Aneel sdo Sabatinados
[Presidential Nominations to Aneel Submited to Congressional Hearings], 0 ESTADO
DE SA PAULO, May 2, 2001.
293.
See Lei No. 9.427, art. 29, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de
27.12.1996. (Brazil).
294.
Medina, supra note 215.
295.
Ironically, this structure created more modulated staggered terms than the
ones designed in the constitutive statute.
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nomination. 296 In other words, the current provisions state that the
term runs with the person. One possible solution to this problem is
changing the statutory provision that defines the length of the
directors' terms of office. The new provisions should fix the terms of
office in time, defining the date on which the terms of office will end.
This is the system adopted at the SEC in the United States, where a
commissioner's term ends June 5th of each year. 29 7 Thus, if the
nomination of a director is delayed for four months, as it was for two
ANEEL commissioners, the term of office still ends on June 5 of the
year in which it was supposed to end. Fixing the terms of offices in
time thereby avoids the irregularities that are created with delays in
Brazil.
F. FinancialAutonomy: Fundingand Budgetary Allocations
Another important guarantee of independence for regulatory
agencies is financial autonomy. The agencies' independence from the
executive branch's policy preferences, especially those of the
President, may be undermined if the latter has control of agencies'
budgets. A possible solution is to grant agencies alternative sources
of funding, which are not part of the Executive fiscal accounts. 298 In
the United States, for instance, IRAs normally have alternative
sources of funds, which come from fees paid by the regulated
industry. 29 9
These alternative funds normally constitute a
3 00
substantial part of the agencies' budgets.

296.
Lei No. 9472, art. 25, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997. (Brazil)
(ANATEL); Lei No. 9.427, arts. 5, 29, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996.
(Brazil) (ANEEL).
297.
SEC, Current SEC Commissioners, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner.
shtml.
298.
See Antonio Estache & David Martimort, Politics, Transaction Costs, and
the Design of Regulatory Institutions 23 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper
No. 2073, 1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html]dec/Publications/
Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2073/wps2073.pdf ("Relying on budgetary transfers
decided by politicians is often viewed as a threat to the independence of the regulators
since an easy way to reduce the effectiveness of a regulator would be to cut its
budgetary allocation."); see also Johannsen, supra note 187, at 48 ("[I]t is generally
assumed that an external source of funding is more stable than government
funding .. ");Smith, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that there is a "strong consensus"
that "[piroviding the agency with a reliable source of funding" is a safeguard required
for agency independence).
299.
The FCC, for instance, has two alternative sources of funding: (i)
application processing fees and (ii) regulatory fees. The application processing fees are
charges for certain types of application processing or authorization services the
Commission provides to communications entities over which it has jurisdiction. These
fees are considered revenues for budgetary purposes (i.e., they are collected by the
exercise of government power and deposited in the U.S. Treasury where they are not
available to the IRAs). In contrast, the regulatory fees are offsetting receipts for
budgetary purposes.
They are fees to recover the annual costs of the FCC's
enforcement, policy and rulemaking, user information, and international activities.
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Following the American model, all Brazilian agencies' main
sources of income come from supervising fees and fines paid by
regulated companies. 30 1 These funds are earmarked, meaning that
the law forbids the use of these funds for purposes other than those
related to the sectors in which these companies operate.30 2 The
alternative funding mechanism has the potential to guarantee
independence if the amount collected is sufficient to cover all the
agency's operational costs. There is, however, a risk: like all the
expenditures made by executive branch bodies, the use of an IRA's
funds has to be previously authorized by the federal budgetary
appropriations. 30 3 Consequently, despite the IRA's independent
sources of income, the entity that controls these appropriations can
30 4
influence the IRA's policy choices.

The fees are considered offsetting receipts because they represent income that
originates from market-oriented activities and the financing of regulatory expenses.
These regulatory fees are deposited in an offsetting receipts account, and are available
to be spent according to the terms of the legislation that established the charges. See
47 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2008) (setting rules for the assessment of application fees); 47
U.S.C.A. § 159 (setting rules for the assessment of regulatory fees); see also OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004. at 87 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/spec.pdf ("In addition to collecting taxes and other receipts by
the exercise of its sovereign powers, . . . the Federal Government collects income from
the public from market-oriented activities and the finances of regulatory expenses.").
See generally Federal Communications Commission Fees, http://www.fcc.gov/fees/ Oast
visited Feb. 17, 2008).
300.
For instance, FCC regulatory fees cover almost all the operational costs of
the agency. In 2002, the FCC collected $218 million in regulatory fees, and the fees
were used to cover the $245 million of operational expenses. In 2003, the agency
collected $239 million, which was used to cover $269 million of operational expenses.
FED. COMMUNICATIONS

COMM'N,

FY 2003

BUDGET ESTIMATES TO CONGRESS

7,

available at http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/fcc2003budget-section_1.pdf.
301.
See, e.g., Lei No. 9.472, art. 47, de 16 de julho de 1997, D.O.U. de 17.7.1997.
(Brazil) (authorizing ANATEL to collect regulatory fees); Lei No. 9.427, arts. 11-13, de
26 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 27.12.1996. (Brazil) (authorizing ANEEL to collect
regulatory fees).
302.
For instance, the President cannot use the fees collected from the electricity
sector to invest in education or health.
303.
CONSTITUIQAO FEDERAL art. 165, para. 5 (Braz.) (indicating that indirect
administration, which includes regulatory agencies, is subject to the same rules as the
direct administration, such as ministries and non-independent agencies).
304.
For literature on the manipulation of agency budgets by elected authorities
in order to influence or control the decision-making process, see generally MARVER H.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 79-84, 128-34, 258
(1955); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY 52-74 (1957);
KENNETH MEIER, REGULATION: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND ECONOMICS 26-27 (1985);
and JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY
THEY DO IT 214-15 (1989).
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There are many scholars who claim that this type of influence
exists in the United States, 30 5 but nobody seems to agree on who has
the "power of the purse." Some believe that the President controls
agency budgets since the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
reviews all agency budgets before sending them to Congress, as part
of the President's budget proposal. 30 6 Others argue that the power of
the purse rests with Congress, which is the branch that enacts
30 7
appropriations bills.
In contrast to the United States, the Brazilian President has
substantial control over the IRAs' budgets due to his power to
interfere significantly in the federal appropriations process. That
process culminates with a statute that defines the actual budget
allocations for one particular fiscal year (Lei Or~amentdriaAnual LOA). 30 8 The process to formulate the LOA starts with a budget
proposal that is sent to Congress by the President. 30 9 This proposal is
formulated by the Secretary of Federal Budget (Secretaria do
Or~amento Federal-SOF), an executive branch department that,
similar to the OMB, receives information from all agencies and offices
310
of the executive branch and analyzes and reviews this information.
After review by the SOF, the IRA's budget is incorporated in the
presidential budget that is sent for congressional approval. 311 The
preparation of this proposal is the first moment at which the

305.
These claims have been supported by case studies, theoretical models, and
quantitative analysis. For a summary of this literature, see Daniel P. Carpenter,
Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation,
90 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 283 (1996).
306.
See Moe, supra note 195, at 201 (noting that the president has substantial
influence over independent commissions through the Office of Management and
Budget); see also D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF
DELEGATION 165-85 (1991) (arguing that Congress has abdicated much of its fiscal
responsibility to the Executive Branch); Morrison, supra note 184, at 252-53 ("[T]he
agency's budget must go through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and,
with only a minor wrinkle or two, the [independent commissions] are subject to
the ...

OMB's authority ..

" (footnote omitted)).

307.
See, e.g., ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE
ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS 34 (1971) (arguing that Congress has "enormous leverage
over general agency policy" because agencies require congressional appropriations to
"alter the scope of their responsibility"). For a case analysis, see Barry R. Weingast &
Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
308.
The LOA is preceded by two statutes. One establishes a plan for budgetary
appropriations for a period of four years (Plano Plurianual-PPA)and the second
defines the principles and guidelines for the public budget in one particular fiscal year
(Lei de Diretrizes Orgamentdrias-LDO). C.F. art. 165.
309.
Id.
310.
Jos6 Mattos Sultani, Autonomia Financeirae Or~amentdriadas Entidades
Autdrquicas em Regime Especial, at 28 (Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de
Janeiro, Institution de Economia, July 2005), available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/
port/public/publ/ieufrj_cvm/LeonardoJoseMattosSultani.pdf.
311.
Id.
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President can influence the agencies' budgets through the
appropriations process.3 12 In 2003, for instance, the 202 million reais
requested by the electricity regulator (ANEEL) was reduced to 162
million by a presidential proposal that was later approved by
313
Congress.
In the 1980s, the United States faced the same problem that
Brazil struggles with today. The U.S. Congress tried to reduce the
discretionary interference of the OMB by asking commissions to
submit their budget proposals simultaneously to the OMB and to
Congress. 314 Congress has the power to change the proposal sent by
OMB; submission to the President and Congress at the same time
3 15
adds to this power unfiltered access to information.
As an attempt to give agencies more independence, this
simultaneous submission could be implemented in the Brazilian
system, but its effectiveness would be considerably limited. In
contrast to the United States, in Brazil, congressional influence on
the appropriations process is strongly limited by constitutional and
statutory provisions that allow for significant presidential control
over the final outcome of the bill approved by Congress.3 16 First, the
President's proposal will be used as law if the congressional statute is
not enacted in timely fashion.3 17 Second, the President may veto
31 8
some of the provisions in the final statute approved by Congress.
Therefore, in Brazil, the President has a strong influence over the
budgetary appropriations process.
In addition, the President also has control over the amount of
funds that the agencies will actually receive.3 19 Thus, in Brazil, there

312.
Id.
313.
A Gestdo nas Ag6ncias Reguladora-Fatos e Repercuss5es [Managing
Regulatory Agencies-Facts and Perceptions], at 18 (presentation of Jos6 Mdrio
Miranda Abdo, Dir., ANEEL, before the Senate Commision on Infrastructure, June 25,
2003), available at http://www.aneel.gov.br/arquivos/PDF/AudienciaPublicaSenado.pdf
[hereinafter Abdo].
314.
Moe, supra note 195, at 200 n.3.
315.
Id.
316.
Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo & Fernando Limongi, Incentivos Eleitorais,
Partidos e Politica Or~amentdria [Electoral Incentives, Parties, and Budgtary Policy],
45

DADOS-REVISTA

CIENCIAS

SOCIAIs

303,

313

(2002),

available

at

http://www.scielo.br/pdf/dados/v45n2/10790.pdf.
317.
This has been the practice, given the silence of the constitution on this
matter and the fact that no budget is approved on time in Brazil. But it is important to
note that the President's proposal is implemented on a monthly basis until the statute
is approved. Id. at 314.
318.
Id. at 315.
319.
The Ministers of each sector also have this power. For instance, the
Minister of Telecommunications can reduce the budget of the telecommunications
agency. Since the Ministers are appointed and dismissed at the President's will, the
Author is assuming here that they would manage the budget of the agency according to
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is no guarantee that the resources appropriated by Congress and
allocated to the agency will necessarily reach the agency in question.
The President can still modify the congressional appropriations (or
the part of it that is available to the agencies) after their enactment,
during the budget implementation phase, according to his own
discretion. 320
These reductions are made through presidential
decrees, 321 which are unilateral acts of the President not subject to
any congressional control. In contrast, in the United States, the
presidential power to impose delays or to cancel budget resources
(both of which are called impoundments) is subject to congressional
control. 322 In sum, the Brazilian President controls, determines, or
administers the amount of funds the agencies will in fact receive, and
can deeply affect the financial autonomy of those agencies.
The electricity agency (ANEEL) had its appropriations reduced
22% in 2002 and 50% in 2003.323 These reductions were determined
by presidential decree. 324 The President took similar action with
respect to the telecommunications agency ANATEL; he reduced its
budget in 2001, 2002, and 2003,325 with the most recent reduction
being 25%. In fact, in 2005, six infrastructure agencies received only
16% of their appropriations for that year. 326 These reductions show
that the President can decrease the amounts allocated to the IRAs by

Presidential preferences. Thus, the distinction between reductions imposed by the
President himself or the Minister of the sector is not relevant.
320.
The LOA defines only the maximum expenditures the President and the
Executive branch are authorized to make in a particular fiscal year. Thus, the
President cannot surpass the limit approved by Congress, unless Congress authorizes
him to do so.
321.
In Portuguese, these decrees are called Decretos de Execugdo Orgamentdria.
322.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 regulates
these impoundments and establishes procedures that do not allow the President to
abrogate the intention of Congress. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-688 (West 2008).
323.
See Abdo, supra note 313, at 18 (This report informs that in 2002, the 174
million reais approved by the LOA was reduced to 145 million reais by a presidential
decree and only 137 million was effectively transferred to ANEEL. In 2003, the 162
million reais approved in the LOA was reduced to 70 million by presidential decree. In
May 2003, an additional 12 million was added to the 70 million, bringing the sum to 82
million for 2003.).
324.
Decreto No. 4.708, de 28 de maio de 2003, D.O.U. de 29.5.2003. (Brazil);
Decreto No. 4.591, de 10 de fevereiro de 2003, D.O.U. de 11.2.2003. (Brazil); Decreto
No. 4.120, de 7 de fevereiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 8.2.2002. (Brazil).
325.
Decreto No. 4.591, de 10 de fevereiro de 2003, D.O.U. de 11.2.2003. (Brazil);
Decreto No. 4.120, de 7 de fevereiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 8.2.2002. (Brazil); Decreto No.
4.051, de 12 de dezembro de 2001, D.O.U. de 13.12.2001. (Brazil); Decreto No. 4.031, de
23 de novembro de 2001, D.O.U. de 26.11.2001. (Brazil); Decreto No. 3.878, de 25 de
julho de 2001, D.O.U. de 27.7.2001. (Brazil); Decreto No. 3.746, de 6 de fevereiro de
2001, D.O.U. de 7.2.2001. (Brazil).
326.
Laszlo Vargas, Aggncias Fazem ato Contra o Governo [Agencies Protest],
FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, May 6, 2003, at B1; Ren~e Pereira, Governo Lula Corta Verbas e
Asfixia Agencias [Lula's Administration Cuts the Budget and Suffocates Agencies], 0
ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, July 3, 2006.
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Congress to amounts originally proposed by the President or even
lower amounts.
In addition to the power to reduce the allocations provided by
Congress, the President can also impose limits on specific types of
financial expenditures, thereby delineating financial obligations and
commitments of a particular administrative office during a specific
fiscal year. In 2003, for instance, a presidential decree limited the
travel expenses of the employees of all executive branch bodies
(including ministries) to 60% of the total amount spent in 2002.327
The agencies, as bodies of the executive branch that belong to the
328
ministries, were also subject to these limits.
In conclusion, alternative sources of funding do not effectively
guarantee independence for IRAs in Brazil due to presidential control
of the budgetary allocations process. Ultimately, IRAs do not receive
the amount assigned to them by the LOA; instead, they receive the
allocation approved unilaterally by the President. After the LOA's
enactment, there is still much uncertainty as to the amount that will
be allocated to IRAs. 3 29 The President may use his power to
unilaterally control the agencies' financial resources as an incentive
for agencies to adopt his preferences, under the threat of a budget
reduction.
There are at least two possible solutions to this problem. First, if
budget allocations to regulatory agencies have been significantly
reduced by presidential decrees with the purpose of reducing
agencies' independence, 330 an answer would be to limit Executive
discretion in executing the budget approved by Congress.
For
instance, impoundments of IRAs could be subjected to congressional
approval. 3 31 Second, if the President has been using reductions to
produce a surplus in fiscal accounts, 332 it is necessary to prohibit

327.
Decreto No. 4.691, art. 2, de 8 de maio de 2003, D.O.U. de 9.5.2003. (Brazil).
328.
Id.
329.
This is a problem for all executive offices in Brazil - not only IRAs. WORLD
BANK, RELAT6RIO SOBRE A AvALIAQkO DO SISTEMA DE ADMINISTRAQ O E CONTROLE
FINANCEIROS DO BRASIL [REPORT ON THE SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF BRAZIL] (2002), available at http://www.planejamento.gov.br/
arquivos-downlsof/TextoCFAA.pdf.
330.
In May 2003, representatives of the agencies suggested that reductions in
their budgets were threats to agencies autonomy. Ag~ncias Criticam o Governo por
Corte de Verba [Agencies Criticize the Government for Budgetary Cuts], FOLHA DE SAO
PAULO, May 6, 2003, at Al.
331.
Luiz Antonio Ramos Veras, Propostapara Fortalecero Estado Regulador no
Brasil [Proposal To Strengthen the Regulatory State in Brazil] (2004) (on file with
author).
332.
In response to the accusation that Lula is trying to reduce the
independence of the agencies, the administration argues that the budget reduction is
being used to generate a fiscal surplus. In this context, it is interesting to note that the
government is not reducing the budget equally among different governmental bodies.
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diversion of regulatory fees to other uses by the government. Under
this prohibition, the excess in regulatory fees not used to cover
operational expenditures would then automatically revert to the
regulated companies (this is called revolving funds). In this case, the
government should still be able to make cuts in IRA spending to
control fiscal deficits, but would not be allowed the use of IRA
resources to produce a fiscal surplus. Both suggestions would bring
the Brazilian system closer to the U.S. system (in which
impoundments by the President are subject to congressional control
and a revolving funds system is in place) 333 and solve the problem
regardless of actual presidential motives (fiscal surplus or reducing
agencies' independence).
G. Institutional Guaranteesof Independence in Brazil: A Summary
The comparison with the United States shows that Brazilian
agencies could be significantly more independent than they are now.
At least three different problems impair IRA independence in
Brazil. 334 First, some agencies simply lack relevant institutional
guarantees. An example of a guarantee that could be implemented in
Brazil is to have internal elections for chairmen (Part V.B.). As the
U.S. experience demonstrates, internal elections for chairmen would
reduce presidential influence over the agency. Another example is a
partisan balance requirement within the commissions (Part V.C).
Although adjustments might be necessary to make this U.S. feature
functional in the Brazilian political system, this guarantee would
allow for greater plurality within the commission during the term of
the presidential mandate.
Second, some IRAs imported guarantees with defective designs.
For instance, the terms of office for directors in Brazil could be
increased (Part V.D). ANEEL and the majority of IRAs in Brazil
have terms of office that coincide with the presidential mandate. The

Instead, regulatory agencies have been the governmental entities most affected by
budget reductions.
Romiro Ribeiro, Consultoria de Orcamento e Fiscalizado
Financeira-Cdmara dos Deputados [Department of Budget and Financial
Fiscalization - Chamber of Deputies], NOTA T9CNICA NO. 12 (2004) (on file with
author); Receita Vinculada Ajuda no Superdvit [Agencies' Budget Helps the Surplus],
VALOR ECONOMICO (Sao Paulo), Oct 4, 2004.
333.
See ASHLEY C. BROWN & ERICSON DE PAULA, THE WORLD BANK PPIAF
PROJECT FOR BRAZIL POWER SECTOR: STRENGTHENING OF THE INSTITUTIONAL AND

REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF THE BRAZILIAN POWER SECTOR 24-25 (2002), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepgfbrown-papers/a.brown-hepg-wrld.bank.regulatory.
structure.brazil.power.report_12-02.pdf (resolving that Brazilian legislators should
"eliminate the possibility" of the Government punishing ANEEL by legally prohibiting
diversion of regulatory fees," and by subjecting ANEEL to "the same budget approval
process to which other parts of the government are subject").
334.
The Author is not developing an argument in favor of specific reforms of the
institutional design of regulatory agencies in Brazil. See infra Part VI.
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resulting guarantee of independence is not as effective as it would be
if terms of office were longer than the presidential mandate, such as
those adopted by ANATEL. But even for ANATEL, the terms are
equal in length to the shortest term of office for U.S. IRAs
(approximately five years). Longer terms, like seven or nine years,
seem to secure higher levels of independence. Another institutional
design that can be improved is the system of staggered terms. While
ANATEL adopted a design similar to the U.S. design, with no
overlapping nominations, ANEEL has a significant number of
overlapping nominations, all of which are concentrated at the
beginning of the presidential mandate.
Third, some IRAs have implemented guarantees of independence
that are similar to their counterparts in the United States, but that
lack effectiveness either because they were not adapted to operate in
the Brazilian system or because they were already ineffective in the
United States. There are at least two examples of guarantees of
independence transplanted from the U.S. context that proved very
ineffective in the Brazilian system. The first, staggered terms of
office (Part V.E), was not implemented in Brazil according to the
statute's letter, thereby generating a series of nominations that did
not follow the timeline established by the agencies' constitutive
statutes. Both ANEEL and ANATEL suffered from delays in the
nominations. The remedy could be a statutory provision defining the
date at which the term of office would end, as in the United States.
The second example of an ineffective transplanted guarantee of
independence relates to the agencies' financial autonomy (Part V.F).
Although the Brazilian system guarantees to agencies alternative
sources of income, the President largely controls the federal
appropriations process. As a result, the alternative sources of income
have become ineffective guarantees of independence for IRAs in
Brazil. Again, the solution could be based on the U.S. system: to limit
the President's power in reducing agency budgets (through
congressional control of impoundments), and the devolution to the
regulated industry of those funds that were not used by the agency.
Finally, there are two examples of guarantees that are
ineffective both in Brazil and in the United States. The first is the
lack of removal power (Part V.A). Both ANEEL and ANATEL faced
problems with "throwing in the towel" and "political drift." These
problems occur in the United States as well. Second, the senatorial
veto of presidential nominations (Part V.C) is as limited in Brazil as
it is in the United States. In these two cases, Brazil needs to look for
innovative solutions to increase the degree of independence of its
agencies, since the U.S. model has little to offer in this aspect.
These institutional details help us understand the behavior of
Brazilian IRAs in the episodes described earlier (Part III). In the rate
increase cases, ANATEL resisted the government's pressure to halt
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increases while ANEEL did not. In 2003, the first year of the
Presidential mandate, the Lula administration managed to "convince"
the directors of the electricity agency to halt rate increases that were
previewed in contracts and in the regulation (Part III.A). They also
tried to convince the telecommunications agency do to the same,
without success (Part III.B). The fact that ANATEL was able to
resist governmental pressure might be linked to the fact that
ANATEL has stronger institutional guarantees of independence,
being in general more independent than ANEEL.
In the fourth year of the Presidential mandate (2006), however,
ANATEL was not as resistant as before. This is illustrated by the
agency's initial support of a policy to shift from pulse rates to minute
rates, but subsequent failure to resist the governmental decision to
postpone the implementation of the policy (Part III.C). This case
should be analyzed in light of important details on the institutional
design of the agency, such as: (i) lack of partisan balance
requirements, which create decreasing levels of independence to all
agencies in Brazil at the final years of the presidential mandate, (ii)
lack of effectiveness of the staggered terms of office in Brazil, which
allowed Lula to appoint the majority of ANATEL's directors at the
end of 2004, and (iii) Presidential constraints over IRA budgets,
which made ANATEL operate under increasingly severe financial
constraints throughout this entire period.
All these measures
probably combined to reduce ANATEL's independence as the years
went by.
While the lack of resistance to Presidential influence on the side
of ANATEL was a surprise, the behavior of ANEEL was not. In 2005,
the Minister of Energy instructed the agency to modify a draft
regulation, and the agency followed the instruction promptly. This
type of behavior does not deviate from the pattern seen in 2003, and
can be associated with the weak guarantees of independence that
ANEEL has had since its creation, combined with other Presidential
measures to weaken the body such as significantly reducing the
budget of the agency.

VI. LESSONS FROM THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE

In the context of development reforms, Brazilian IRAs
demonstrate how the adaptability and functionality of new
institutions depends upon the legal, political, and institutional
environment in which they will be operating. There are two types of
concerns. One concern relates to the way the existing political, legal,
and institutional framework might affect the functioning of the
agencies, and how certain institutional designs might not operate
properly when transplanted to a different environment.
The
Brazilian case shows that the design of institutional reforms should
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take the existing framework into consideration, as opposed to
adopting one-size-fits-all formulas. A second concern implicates the
opposite problem: how IRAs affect the functioning of the existing
legal, political, and institutional environment? This last concern
suggests that instead of rushing to design institutional structures
well suited to Brazil that would increase the level of independence of
Brazilian IRAs, Brazil-and other developing countries-should be
engaging in a more thorough discussion of the benefits and costs of
bureaucratic
independence
in
key
infrastructure
sectors.
Independence is not always the best design choice.
As to the first concern, the Brazilian experience with regulatory
agencies reflects some of the problems that plague the
implementation of development reforms around the world. First,
important details of the electricity and telecommunications agencies'
institutional design in Brazil were largely determined by the
distribution of power among different interest groups.
This
illustrates how groups with common interests might use the political
process to affect reforms that are beneficial to them. This is often an
impediment to effective institutional reforms in developing
countries. 335
Second, reformers used legal transplants without
adapting them to the local conditions and particularities of the
Brazilian social, political, and legal systems. 336 In this sense, the
Brazilian experience with IRAs is another example of the dangers
and difficulties in using one-size-fits-all formulas in development
policies. 337 The most radical version of this concern proposes that
development policies should be designed on the ground, as opposed to
being imposed top-down: Brazil should find its own formula of
bureaucratic independence instead of relying on the U.S. model. The
milder version, in contrast, suggests that reformers should adapt
U.S.-style agencies to Brazil and its institutional environment.
Finally, some of the reformers' assumptions regarding the functioning
of regulatory agencies in the United States were not accurate. A

335.
See Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule
of Law Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 99, 109 (2004) (classifying
"lack of effective political demand for reforms" and "vested supply-side interests" which
render "reforms politically difficult to realize" as major impediments to development).
336. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, & Jean-Francois Richard,
Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165
(2003) (analyzing "the determinants of effective legal institutions" using data from
forty-nine different countries, including Brazil).
337.
See WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S
EFFORTS To AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD 100-01

(2006); see also Eberhard, supra note 27, at 29 ("Increasing discretion in regulatory
systems can facilitate adjustment to new events .. ");Dani Rodrik, Institutions for
High Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them, 35 STUD. COMP. INT'L
DEV. 3, 3 (2000) (noting that one cannot "over-emphasize best-practice 'blueprints").
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mythical, idealized view of the U.S. system has negatively affected
some of the development reform policies designed in the 1960s and
1970s, 338 and reformers seem to be making the same errors today.
One should not, however, rush to design independent agencies
that would be suited to the Brazilian environment and elaborate an
implementation strategy that could overcome the political-economic
obstacles to such reforms. Before doing that, it is necessary to
conduct a comprehensive debate about the benefits and costs of
regulatory independence.3 39 It is important to emphasize that the
independence of regulators comes at a cost for the government and for
society. In the cases discussed earlier (Part III), the IRAs' decisions
effected the macro-economy and other governmental policies. High
rates for telecommunications and electricity services, for instance,
may impair inflation control and undermine consumer protections.
Should agencies be insulated from political influence when inflation
and consumer protection are the actual reasons for efforts to exert
political influence over an IRA? Should we insulate agencies from all
types of political influence or only opportunistic ones? If the latter,
how do we decide what is opportunistic and what is not?
On the one hand, the reason for securing the independence of
regulatory agencies, as mentioned above, is that presidential control
over such agencies may impair the functioning of these services by
subordinating them to opportunistic political decisions. On the other
hand, if infrastructure services are essential, the functioning of the
political system and the operation of the executive branch to further
popular interests vested in the elected president are also important.
While the reasons that call for independence are mainly related to the
functioning of regulated sectors, a counter-argument concerns the
functioning of the executive branch in a democratic regime. Thus,
before considering what kind of institutional design will guarantee
independence to these agencies, one must answer some fundamental
questions, such as how much independence is desirable, from whom,
under what conditions, and for which purposes.
Delegation of powers to independent agencies is often
interpreted as a sign of commitment because the government is
predicting the possibility of acting opportunistically once reforms
have been implemented and elects to tie its hands in order to avoid
doing so. As mentioned in the introduction, the metaphor of Ulysses
and the Sirens is often used to illustrate the rationale behind this

338.
See David M. Trubek & Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States,
1974 WiS. L. REV. 1062, 1090-91 (showing that the first law and development
movement was criticized for a mythical view of the U.S. legal system).
339.
See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text; see also Elster, supra note 5,
at 66-71 (analyzing the complexity of establishing constitutions and analogizing
constitutional courts and banks to a "double-edged suicide").
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decision to delegate: knowing the danger of the Sirens beforehand,
Ulysses ties himself to the mast and seals his seamen's ears with
wax, to resist the temptation of luring the boat to destruction by
hearing the song of the Sirens.
Ironically, the analogy also
illuminates the problem that the Author is trying to highlight here: it
would be impossible for Ulysses to complete his trip sucessfully
without commanding his boat. Ulysses' seamen would not be capable
of taking the boat to its destiny without having a captain to
coordinate their actions (e.g. rowing in the same direction at a certain
pace). This is the reason why Ulysses seals their ears with wax, and
asks them to tie him to the mast for a limited period of time: Ulysses
is released and the seamen can unseal their ears once they have
passed the region in which the Sirens sing. Similarly, a President
cannot be expected to successfully govern a country and implement
his policies without coordinating the acts and decisions of many
different entities. A series of completely independent agencies that
do what they think is best for their own sectors are like a boat
without a captain; it is unlikely that the individual acts of the seamen
will take the boat anywhere, let alone to its destination.
The metaphor of Ulysses and the Sirens shows that
independence is important to attract private investment (Ulysses's
boat would have sunk if he had not taken the precautions he did), but
one cannot base a reform solely on these grounds (Ulysses' boat would
not have reached its destination if he had tried to make the entire
trip tied to the mast, without being able to communicate with his
seamen, who had their ears sealed with wax). The difference between
the myth of Ulysses and the delegation of power to IRAs is that the
President constantly has the risk of hearing the Sirens. So, the
President does not have an option to tie himself to the mast for a
limited period of time. The question that remains, therefore, is how
he can resist the temptation while at the same time being able to
command the boat, and to guide it to its destiny.
There is a necessary tradeoff in the design of all guarantees of
independence. If the guarantee is too weak, it will create too low a
level of independence, which might impair the functioning of
regulated sectors, but protect the Presidential agenda (and
supposedly the interests of the majority in a democratic system). If
the guarantee is too strong, it will impose on an elected government
some obstacles to the implementation of its policies, but will favor a
supposedly efficient functioning of infrastructural sectors. As a
consequence, guaranteeing independence of regulatory agenciesand, more specifically, designing guarantees of independence-has to
take into account these tradeoffs and try to find the best balance
possible between these conflicting goals. To determine where Brazil
should go from here, one should not ask whether IRAs are
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independent or not, but rather what kind and what level of
independence should be granted to them.
The utmost level of independence that could be granted to IRAs
would be complete political insulation, guaranteed by an institutional
design similar to the judiciary (term of office for life, independent
budget, its own civil service system).3 40 Certainly, Brazil was not
looking for complete insulation when it adopted the U.S.-style
agencies in conjunction with the privatization reform. But even if we
eliminate the judiciary-like design for IRAs, there is still a wide range
of options of institutional designs between traditional bureaucracy
(absolute subordination) and the judiciary (absolute independence).
Which one should we choose? The response to this question requires
a careful analysis of what will be gained and lost with further
institutional changes and, most importantly, who will appropriate
these gains and who will bear the losses. However, this calculus is
beyond the scope of the Article.

VII. CONCLUSION

IRAs were implemented in Brazil to protect private investors.
Their main function was to insulate regulatory decisions from
presidential influence (Part II). This insulation would be guaranteed
by certain institutional guarantees of independence, such as lack of
In analyzing these
removal power, financial autonomy, etc.
concluded that the
have
scholars
some
institutional guarantees,
evidence that the
however,
are
independent;
agencies
Brazilian
Executive branch managed to influence regulatory outcomes in both
the telecommunications and electricity sectors casts doubts on these
conclusions (Part III). This Article asked whether Brazilian IRAs are
as independent as perceived or expected. The comparison with
institutional features of U.S. agencies suggests that they are not.
The Article shows that at least three different problems impair
IRA independence in Brazil (Part V). First, some agencies simply
lack the appropriate institutional guarantees of independence.
Second, some agencies imported guarantees with a defective design,
which reduces these agencies' independence. Third, some agencies
implemented guarantees that are very similar or identical to the U.S.
institutional design, but these features lack effectiveness. This lack
of effectiveness arises because, when incorporated in the Brazilian
political and legal system, the features do not function in the same
Furthermore, some
way that they do in the United States.
institutional features replicate in Brazil problems that already exist
in the U.S. system. All these factors illustrate that the degree of
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independence of regulatory agencies in Brazil is not very high. In
this context, the level of independence of ANEEL, from an
institutional perspective, is lower than the level of independence of
ANATEL. The differences in institutional design of these two
agencies are associated with the political economy of the reforms in
these two sectors (Part IV).
Why didn't those who previously analyzed the institutional
design of regulatory agencies in Brazil perceive these problems? One
possible explanation is that they were only paying attention to the
existence and the general design of guarantees of independence,
whereas this Article also analyzes the details of these designs and
their actual functioning within the Brazilian legal and political
system. 34 1 Another possible explanation is that purely institutional
analysis cannot grasp the actual level of independence of IRAs. In
fact, if the effectiveness of these institutional guarantees of
independence is considered, all Brazilian agencies seem to have a low
34 2
level of independence.
The lesson that can be taken from the Brazilian experience is
that development policies should not only identify the institutional
reforms that will provide developing countries with the capacity to
improve their conditions, but should also inquire into the adaptability
and functionality of these reforms. 343 The challenges to guarantee
independence of Brazilian regulatory agencies echo the problems of
implementing development reforms around the world. First, these
challenges show that political economy is often an impediment for
institutional reforms in developing countries. Second, they illustrate
the need to adapt legal transplants to the local conditions and
particularities of the transplanting country.
Finally, they call
attention to the dangers of adopting a mythical, idealized view of the
transplanted legal system rather than developing the necessary
critical analysis.
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Thatcher and Gilardi recognize the existence of these different levels and
have developed techniques for measuring independence of regulatory agencies in the
European case. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
342.
For a similar distinction in the context of judicial independence, see Lars P.
Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country
Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators (CESifo Working Paper Series, No. 906, Apr.
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=395403.
343.
The Article, however, does not go as far as urging reformers to redesign
IRAs in Brazil so as to increase their level of independence. The Author's analysis
shows that agencies are not as independent as perceived or expected, but the Author
acknowledges that increasing the level of independence of regulatory agencies in Brazil
could generate costs to the government and could negatively impact democracy. We
should not subscribe to an agenda of institutional reforms to increase regulatory
agency independence without fully assessing these tradeoffs. More work needs to be
done before assuring what, if anything, needs to be done.

